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FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW: A FAILED APPROACH TO 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR 
REAL REFORM 
by 
Elizabeth M. McCormick* 
In July 2015, Kate Steinle, a 32-year-old San Francisco resident, was 
shot and killed as she walked with her father along a popular fishing 
pier. Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, a native of Mexico living 
unlawfully in the United States, was arrested and later confessed to 
shooting Ms. Steinle. Lopez-Sanchez had seven prior criminal 
convictions and had previously been deported from the United States five 
times. Three months before the shooting, Lopez-Sanchez was released from 
custody by the San Francisco Sheriff’s office despite a request from federal 
immigration officials that Lopez-Sanchez be detained for transfer to 
federal custody and, eventually, removal from the United States. 
In the aftermath of Steinle’s death, a torrent of accusations and blame 
were leveled at the San Francisco Sheriff’s office for failing to comply with 
the immigration detainer, at the City of San Francisco for establishing 
itself as a sanctuary city where unauthorized immigrants are alleged to 
be immune from prosecution of immigration law violations, and at the 
Obama administration for failing to enforce federal laws designed to 
shut down sanctuary cities. More specifically, it was argued that two 
federal “anti-sanctuary” laws passed in 1996 made it illegal for San 
Francisco to refuse to comply with federal immigration authorities’ 
requests for assistance and that the Obama administration had willfully 
failed to enforce those laws against hundreds of sanctuary jurisdictions. 
Had these laws been obeyed and enforced, critics asked, would Kate 
Steinle be alive today? 
This Article offers an answer to this question. It does so by closely 
examining the history of the 1996 federal anti-sanctuary laws, the ways 
in which state and federal courts have understood their meaning and 
purpose, and the evolving role of the statutes in the national 
 
* Associate Clinical Professor and Associate Dean of Experiential Education, 
University of Tulsa College of Law. I am grateful for thoughtful comments and 
feedback on early drafts of this Article, especially from participants in the 2014 
Clinical Law Review Workshop at New York University. Special thanks also to James 
Curtis for his research assistance. 
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immigration debate, in particular the struggle to define the proper role for 
state and local actors in immigration enforcement. The Article closes with 
a discussion of the anti-sanctuary statutes in the context of Kate Steinle’s 
killing and San Francisco’s sanctuary law, concluding that the San 
Francisco ordinance which mandated Lopez-Sanchez’s release from 
custody did not violate the anti-sanctuary statutes or any other federal 
law. On the other hand, San Francisco’s sanctuary provision also did 
not prohibit the San Francisco Sheriff from contacting federal 
immigration officials to advise them that Lopez-Sanchez would be 
released, something that did not happen and that may very well have 
saved Kate Steinle’s life. Almost two decades of experience with the anti-
sanctuary statutes and the recent senseless death of Kate Steinle reveal 
that an anti-sanctuary approach to immigration enforcement is a failed 
strategy that diverts resources from enforcement priorities like national 
security and public safety and diverts attention from seeking real 
solutions through comprehensive immigration reform. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2015, Kate Steinle, a 32-year-old San Francisco resident, 
was shot and killed as she walked with her father along a popular fishing 
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pier.1 Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez,2 a native of Mexico living unlawfully 
in the United States on and off since 1991, was arrested and later con-
fessed to shooting Ms. Steinle. Sanchez had a number of prior criminal 
convictions and had previously been deported from the United States 
five times. Three months before the shooting, Sanchez was released from 
custody by the San Francisco Sheriff’s office despite a request from fed-
eral immigration officials that Sanchez be detained for transfer to federal 
custody and, eventually, removal from the United States.3 For more than 
a year, a San Francisco ordinance had been in place which prohibited 
city officials from keeping an individual in custody based on a civil immi-
gration detainer like the one lodged by the U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) against Lopez-Sanchez, except where that per-
son had a felony conviction within seven years and a judicial warrant had 
been issued.4 Since no warrant was provided to the Sheriff for Lopez-
Sanchez, he was released from custody when his San Francisco criminal 
case, a 20-year-old drug charge, was dismissed.5 In the aftermath of 
Steinle’s death, accusations and blame have been leveled at the San 
Francisco Sheriff’s office for failing to comply with the immigration de-
tainer, at the City of San Francisco for establishing itself as a sanctuary 
city6 where unauthorized immigrants are alleged to be immune from 
prosecution of immigration law violations, and at the Obama administra-
tion for failing to enforce federal laws designed to shut down sanctuary 
cities.7 More specifically, it has been argued that two federal laws passed 
 
1 Lee Romney, Family of Woman Allegedly Slain by Deportee Files Claims Against S.F. 
and U.S., L.A. Times (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
kate-steinle-claims-20150901-story.html; Lee Romney et al., Fatal Shooting of S.F. 
Woman Reveals Disconnect Between ICE, Local Police; 5-time Deportee Charged, L.A. Times 
(July 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-sf-shooting-20150707-
story.html. 
2 Federal authorities gave his real name as Jose Inez Garcia-Zarate. Juan 
Francisco Lopez-Sanchez is one of several pseudonyms he has used. Romney et al., 
supra note 1. 
3 Id. 
4 See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12I (2015). The ordinance was an amendment to 
the administrative code and was entitled “Due Process Ordinance for All on Civil 
Immigration Detainers.”  
5 See Romney et al., supra note 1. 
6 See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12H (2015). San Francisco passed the City and 
County of Refuge ordinance in 1989. The ordinance bars the use of city resources to 
assist with immigration enforcement or immigration status checks. The ordinance 
also prohibits local officials from detaining, arresting, or questioning an individual on 
the basis of immigration status. Finally, the ordinance prohibits gathering or 
disseminating information about individuals’ immigration status, except in the case 
of individuals charged with or convicted of felonies. 
7 Scott Eric Kaufman, Bill O’Reilly: The Murder of Kate Steinle Proves Donald Trump Is 
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in 1996 made it illegal for San Francisco to refuse to comply with federal 
immigration authorities’ requests for assistance and that the Obama ad-
ministration had willfully failed to enforce those laws against hundreds of 
sanctuary jurisdictions. Had these laws been obeyed and enforced, critics 
argue, Kate Steinle would be alive today. 
It seems beyond dispute that there was a significant failure in the 
immigration-enforcement system that permitted the release of Francisco 
Lopez-Sanchez, an unauthorized immigrant who had been deported at 
least five times, had multiple felony drug convictions, and had served 
lengthy prison terms for at least two convictions for illegal reentry after 
removal.8 What is much less clear is whether two federal laws in place 
since 1996, even with 100% compliance and enforcement, would have 
blocked San Francisco from putting in place its 2013 civil-detainer ordi-
nance or the city’s long-standing sanctuary ordinance, or prevented 
Lopez-Sanchez’s release from custody three months before Kate Steinle’s 
fatal shooting. Since Steinle’s killing, lawmakers and political commenta-
tors have debated whether San Francisco or any other state or municipal-
ity can lawfully refuse to cooperate in the enforcement of federal immi-
gration laws.9 In particular, they disagree about whether two federal 
statutes enacted in 1996 require such cooperation in immigration en-
forcement, or merely encourage it. Although Kate Steinle’s death has 
brought renewed attention to this issue, the question itself is anything 
but new. 
In 1996, Congress passed two laws that prohibit state or local gov-
ernments from restricting communication with the federal government 
regarding the immigration status of any individual. Section 434 of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1644,10 and § 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. § 1373,11 were 
passed within weeks of each other in an attempt to encourage and explic-
itly authorize state and local law enforcement agencies to communicate 
 
Right About Mexicans, Salon (July 7, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/07/07/ 
bill_oreilly_the_murder_of_kate_steinle_proves_donald_trump_is_right_about_mexi
cans/ (reporting statement of commentator Bill O’Reilly that “the mayor and city 
supervisors of San Francisco are directly responsible for the murder of Kate Steinle, 
and the Obama administration is complicit”). 
8 See Romney et al., supra note 1. 
9 See, e.g., United States Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 9, 62–64 (2015) [hereinafter Homeland Security Hearing] 
(statement of Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Security) (stating that mandating 
state cooperation might violate the Constitution). 
10 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012)). 
11 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373(2012)).  
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with federal immigration authorities regarding the status and presence of 
unauthorized immigrants in their jurisdictions. In addition to encourag-
ing cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts, these 
provisions were also a response to certain noncooperation or sanctuary 
policies and practices adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s by some state 
and local governments and law enforcement agencies who objected to 
federal immigration policies and priorities and to efforts to involve state 
and local government actors in immigration policing. Notably, neither of 
the 1996 federal anti-sanctuary statutes12 mandates cooperation or shar-
ing of information with federal immigration authorities, but both prohib-
it any restriction on information sharing between the federal government 
and state or local government entities or officials. In the almost two dec-
ades since they became law, the anti-sanctuary provisions have been at 
the center of legal challenges brought by local governments preemptively 
defending local sanctuary provisions and private citizens and organiza-
tions challenging local policies and practices alleged to violate these fed-
eral laws. 
Just days after the laws went into effect in 1996, the City of New York 
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the statutes and 
defending a 1989 executive order that prohibited New York City officials 
and employees from sharing information with federal immigration au-
thorities.13 In response, the United States defended the statutes by argu-
ing that a local policy like New York’s, which barred voluntary coopera-
tion with federal immigration authorities was incompatible with effective 
implementation of federal immigration laws and policy and was therefore 
 
12 Throughout this Article, I refer to 8 USC §§ 1644 and 1373 as “anti-sanctuary 
statutes” or “anti-sanctuary provisions” as a shorthand reference only. Similarly, the 
use of the term “sanctuary” is used here to refer in general to measures adopted by 
localities that place limits of any kind on the assistance that the localities will provide 
to federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration law. 
There is no definition of “sanctuary” in federal law and there is a wide and diverse 
range of activities that might qualify as a “sanctuary” measure under the definition I 
use here. I acknowledge, as discussed further, that the use of the term sanctuary is 
itself controversial in that it is often used pejoratively by those who oppose sub-federal 
efforts by state and municipal governments to limit cooperation or assistance with 
federal immigration authorities, and some jurisdictions that have been labeled with 
the term reject it outright. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: 
Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. Irvine L. 
Rev. 247, 253–54 (2012). See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: 
Immigration Metaphors and the Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 1545 
(2011) (asserting that the current immigration linguistic metaphors are problematic 
and suggesting that changes, such as using the word “migration” rather than 
“immigration,” will help humanize the dialogue surrounding immigration and 
immigration reform). 
13 See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31–33 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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preempted by the federal statutes at issue. The City’s challenge failed in 
federal district court and on appeal.14 The statutes have also been the ba-
sis of unsuccessful challenges to local law enforcement policies that pur-
port to restrict communication by police officers with federal immigra-
tion authorities about the immigration status of individuals the officers 
encounter in the course of their duties.15 However, since 1996, the Unit-
ed States government has never sought to enforce these laws against a 
state or local government, or to invalidate a sub-federal sanctuary law or 
practice based on these provisions.16 
Indeed, rather than being used as a weapon against sub-federal re-
strictions on cooperation or communications with federal immigration 
authorities, in recent years the anti-sanctuary provisions have been used 
instead to both challenge and support state and local efforts to engage in 
the enforcement of federal immigration laws. On the one hand, propo-
nents of more robust state and local involvement in immigration regula-
tion and enforcement have repeatedly argued that the anti-sanctuary 
provisions are an expression of Congress’s clear intent to maximize co-
operation between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in 
enforcing federal immigration laws. To that end, they argue, the in-
volvement of local law enforcement in immigration policing, as well as 
efforts by state and local lawmakers to regulate in the area of immigra-
tion, are desirable and appropriate. On the other hand, proponents of 
less state and local involvement in immigration enforcement, including 
the Obama administration, have argued that the anti-sanctuary provisions 
preempt certain state and local efforts to engage in immigration en-
forcement by drawing explicit limits on the nature of non-federal en-
gagement in immigration enforcement. For example, in the lawsuit 
brought by the United States against Arizona challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Arizona Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neigh-
borhoods Act (S.B. 1070), the U.S. Department of Justice argued that § 2 
 
14 See infra Part III.A. 
15 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hurtt, 893 F. Supp. 2d 817, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Sturgeon 
v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 722–23 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Fonseca v. Fong, 84 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 572 n.7 (Ct. App. 2008) (declining to address whether or not San 
Francisco’s sanctuary policy conflicted with federal law). 
16 See Appellants’ Opening Brief at 10–12, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 
(9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) (arguing that despite congressional intent to enforce 
federal immigration laws, evidenced by the passage of §§ 1373 and 1644, interior 
enforcement of illegal immigration is lacking due to inability or unwillingness on the 
part of the federal government); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to 
Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 
1384–85 (2006); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) 
(“[I]mmigration law enforcement is as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law 
enforcement, and . . . illegal aliens do not have the right to remain in the United 
States undetected and unapprehended.”). 
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of S.B. 1070 was preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1373.17 Section 2 requires police 
officers to verify the immigration status of anyone stopped or detained 
for any reason where the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the 
person is unlawfully present in the United States.18 This mandatory status 
check, the United States argued, was preempted because it stood as an 
obstacle to federal–state cooperation envisioned by § 1373 by forcing of-
ficers to make status inquiries irrespective of whether such inquiries were 
in line with the government’s immigration enforcement priorities.19 
This evolution of the use and meaning of the so-called anti-sanctuary 
provisions reflects a deepening divide within the federal government and 
between the federal government, the states, and the American public 
around the issue of unauthorized immigration. Since the anti-sanctuary 
provisions were enacted in 1996, the perception that federal government 
efforts to vigorously enforce immigration laws and eliminate unauthor-
ized immigration were being undermined by isolated pockets of state and 
local “sanctuary” efforts,20 has been replaced by a perception that Con-
gress has repeatedly failed to fix a broken immigration system21 and, 
more recently, that the Obama Administration has failed to enforce exist-
ing immigration laws.22 At the same time, though, the efforts of state and 
 
17 See Brief for the United States at 51–52, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
18 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2012). 
19 See Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 46–52. 
20 See Criminal Aliens in the United States, S. Rep. No. 104-48, at 30 (1995) 
(“[B]y adopting non-cooperation laws, local jurisdictions are making effective 
governmental response to the problem of criminal aliens substantially more 
difficult.”). The committee also suggested sanctions against localities with public non-
cooperation policies. Id. at 32. 
21 See Editorial, Now’s Time to Undo ‘96’s Bad Immigration ‘Reform,’ Ariz. Republic, 
Oct. 7, 2000, at B7, 2000 WLNR 10425454; Michael Riley, Failure of ‘86 Immigration 
Reform Holds Lessons for Bush, Denver Post, Nov. 17, 2002, at A27; Press Release, 
Office of Sen. Mel F. Martinez, Sens. Martinez, Obama Urge Comprehensive, 
Realistic Immigration Reform (December 15, 2005) (U.S. Fed. News). 
22 Elizabeth Price Foley, Opinion, Allowing Some Illegal Immigrants to Stay Abuses 
Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2014/11/18/constitutional-limits-of-presidential-action-on-
immigration-12/allowing-some-illegal-immigrants-to-stay-abuses-prosecutorial-
discretion; see also Nigel Duara & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Federal Judge Refuses to Lift 
Injunction on Obama’s Immigration Order, L.A. Times (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-immigration-hanen-20150407-story.html; Jan 
C. Ting, Opinion, Obama’s Own Words Refute His Stand on Immigration Authority, N.Y. 
Times (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/11/18/ 
constitutional-limits-of-presidential-action-on-immigration-12/obamas-own-words-
refute-his-stand-on-immigration-authority. But see Elise Foley, Backlash Against Mass 
Family Immigrant Detention Grows as Senate Democrats Pile On, Huffington Post (June 
2, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/family-immigrant-detention_ 
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local governments to respond to the worsening immigration crisis have 
evolved and now include measures that seek to reinforce federal immi-
gration enforcement, as well as those designed to protect unauthorized 
immigrants from immigration enforcement. In some respects, and in 
surprising ways, §§ 1644 and 1373—the so-called anti-sanctuary provi-
sions—have been instrumental in the evolution of some state and local 
immigration measures on both sides of the spectrum. This, in turn, has 
led to even more confusion and frustration about the meaning of these 
statutes and the meaning of sanctuary itself. This Article examines the 
evolution of the use and meaning of the anti-sanctuary provisions in the 
national immigration debate, and in particular in the struggle to define 
the proper role for sub-federal actors in immigration enforcement. 
Part II will explore the legal and political context in which the anti-
sanctuary laws were enacted, including an examination of the extent to 
which sub-federal noncooperation or sanctuary policies were actually in 
effect and impacting federal enforcement efforts at the time the provi-
sions became law, and also take a closer look at what the language of the 
statutes says and means. Part III will examine the interpretations of 
§§ 1644 and 1373 by federal and state courts considering local noncoop-
eration policies and practices in context. This Part will begin with a dis-
cussion of the unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the anti-sanctuary 
provisions brought by the City of New York in its effort to preserve the 
city’s own sanctuary policy, an executive order prohibiting the disclosure 
of immigration-related information to federal immigration authorities. 
This Part will then consider the use of the federal anti-sanctuary 
measures as the basis for a number of legal challenges, also largely un-
successful, to state and local sanctuary provisions. Part IV will consider 
the relationship between the federal anti-sanctuary provisions and other 
federal privacy protections, examining interpretations of the anti-
sanctuary statutes by federal agencies and courts charged with determin-
ing whether and how privacy protections in other federal laws might be 
impacted by the anti-sanctuary provisions. Part V will look at the role of 
the anti-sanctuary provisions in the proliferation of and challenges to 
sub-federal efforts to enact immigration legislation and enforce federal 
immigration law, including the legal challenge to Arizona’s S.B. 1070. In 
particular, the discussion will examine the ways in which each party in 
United States v. Arizona relied on §§ 1644 and 1373 as support for its posi-
tion, and the federal courts’ reactions to those arguments. 
The Article closes with discussion of the lessons learned two decades 
after the anti-sanctuary provisions became law, what the statutes mean 
 
n_7495282.html; Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor 
Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html. 
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and what they don’t, and how they are situated in the ongoing debate 
over unauthorized immigration and immigration reform. With these les-
sons in mind, the Article then turns to a discussion of the anti-sanctuary 
statutes in the context of Kate Steinle’s killing and San Francisco’s sanc-
tuary law, ultimately concluding that the anti-sanctuary statutes and the 
anti-sanctuary approach to immigration enforcement have been largely 
ineffective, and have diverted resources away from meaningful enforce-
ment and critically needed reforms to the federal immigration system. 
II. THE PATH FROM SANCTUARY TO ANTI-SANCTUARY 
A great deal of scholarship to date has focused on the propriety of 
sanctuary or noncooperation measures enacted by state and municipal 
governments.23 In particular, this scholarship has considered how and 
whether non-federal governments and entities may enact—consistent 
with the U.S. Constitution and federal law—laws, resolutions, and poli-
cies which restrict the ability of state and local actors to engage in the en-
forcement of federal immigration laws or to cooperate with federal gov-
ernment enforcement efforts.24 In doing so, these scholars have 
examined the history and origins of the sanctuary movement, beginning 
with a campaign in the 1980s and 1990s to offer protection to refugees 
from El Salvador and Guatemala whose legitimate claims for asylum in 
the United States were systematically denied.25 They have also described 
how this initially church-led campaign evolved into an effort joined by 
cities and towns across the country who were sympathetic to the cause of 
Latin American refugees and who wanted to offer support and protection 
to these communities by declaring themselves sanctuaries or refuges 
from federal immigration enforcement.26 Finally, they have considered 
how, in recent history, the sanctuary or “new” sanctuary movement has 
 
23 See, e.g., Hing, supra note 12; Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary 
Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 Pepp. L. Rev. 297 (1989); 
Pham, supra note 16; Ruti Teitel, Debating Conviction Against Conviction—Constitutional 
Considerations on the Sanctuary Movement, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 25 (1986); Rose 
Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 573 
(2010). 
24 See, e.g., Hing, supra note 12, at 309–10; Pham, supra note 16, at 1382; see also 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration 
Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1683, 1685 (2009). 
25 See John Fife, From the Sanctuary Movement to No More Deaths, in Religious and 
Ethical Perspectives on Global Migration 257, 257–64 (Elizabeth W. Collier & 
Charles R. Strain eds., 2014); see also Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an 
Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 747, 747–48 (1986); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU 
L. Rev. 133, 139–42 (2008). 
26 See Carro, supra note 23, at 297; Villazor, supra note 25, at 142. 
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expanded to include cities and municipalities and entities within them, 
most notably law enforcement agencies that have adopted policies that 
limit or prohibit involvement in federal immigration enforcement efforts 
in order to protect public safety and preserve relationships with the im-
migrant community.27 This Article narrows the focus of the sanctuary 
scholarship to a consideration of the anti-sanctuary phenomenon that 
emerged in response to the sanctuary movement and subsequent sanctu-
ary policies. The starting point and recurring reference point for this dis-
cussion are the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373. 
At the time §§ 1644 and 1373 were enacted in 1996, more than two 
dozen sanctuary measures had been adopted by U.S. cities and states.28 
Many of these measures were adopted, at least initially, as expressions of 
support for the plight of unauthorized immigrants, primarily asylum 
seekers from Latin America, seeking protection and a right to remain in 
the United States.29 However, by 1996, many of these state and local sanc-
tuary measures were not put in place out of opposition to federal immi-
gration enforcement practices. Rather, the almost universal public justifi-
cation for these efforts by states and cities to protect immigration status 
information from disclosure was promoting the health and safety of the 
entire community, including unauthorized immigrant residents.30 These 
measures included resolutions, municipal ordinances, executive orders 
and proclamations, and, in some cases, state legislative actions.31 They in-
cluded expressions of solidarity with immigrants seeking asylum protec-
tion; directives to government employees, including police officers, to re-
frain from sharing immigration status information or cooperating with 
federal immigration officials; and laws providing access to state driver’s 
licenses and municipal identification cards to all residents regardless of 
immigration status.32 Among the jurisdictions with sanctuary policies or 
 
27 See Hing, supra note 12, at 254–55; Pham, supra note 16, at 1398. 
28 See Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting 
Local Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 La Raza L.J. 50, 51–52 (1994). 
29 Carro, supra note 23, at 297–98; Hing, supra note 12, at 253; Pham, supra note 
16, at 1382–83; see Chi., Ill., Mun. Code 2-173-005 (2015); S.F., Cal., Admin. Code 
§ 12H.2 (2015); see also S.J. Res. 19, 59th Leg. (Mont. 2005); N.M. Exec. Order No. 
2005-019 (Apr. 7, 2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 181.850(1) (2014). But see Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 67.307.2 (West 2014); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j (West 2015); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-9-1006 (LexisNexis 2012); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 2006); Prince 
William County, Va., Resolution 07–894 (Oct. 16, 2007). 
30 Hing, supra note 12, at 253; Villazor, supra note 23, at 593–94; see also Patrick J. 
McDonnell, Law Could Alter Role of Police on Immigration, L.A. Times (Sept. 30, 1996), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-30/news/mn-49038_1_illegal-immigrants (“All 
of these efforts stemmed from a fundamental principle: the need to encourage new 
arrivals—many lacking papers and hailing from troubled homelands where police 
were often thieves and torturers—to come forward and report crimes.”). 
31 Carro, supra note 23, at 305–15; Pham, supra note 16, at 1388–89. 
32 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-36m(b)(1) (West 2014); Newark, N.J., 
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laws in place in 1996 were New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, New York State, and New Mexico.33 Their resistance to in-
volvement with federal immigration enforcement did not go unnoticed. 
In August 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the federal Welfare Re-
form Act,34 which included numerous provisions limiting access to public 
benefits for non-citizens. Among the immigration-related provisions was 
§ 434, entitled “Communication Between State and Local Government 
Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” which be-
came part of federal law at 8 U.S.C. § 1644,35 and provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, 
no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any 
way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.36 
The congressional record provides useful insight into the intended 
scope of the provision and makes clear that Congress’s intent was to en-
courage, but not require, communication between state and local gov-
ernments and federal immigration authorities: 
The conference agreement provides that no State or local govern-
ment entity shall prohibit, or in any way restrict, any entity or offi-
cial from sending to or receiving from the INS information regard-
ing the immigration status of an alien or the presence, 
whereabouts, or activities of illegal aliens. It does not require, in 
and of itself, any government agency or law enforcement official to 
communicate with the INS. 
The conferees intend to give State and local officials the authority 
to communicate with the INS regarding the presence, whereabouts, 
or activities of illegal aliens. This provision is designed to prevent 
 
Ordinance 15-0804 (May 20, 2015); N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 3-115(c)(2) (2015); 
S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12.H; Takoma Park, Md., Mun. Code § 9.04.010 (2015). 
33 See N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 3-115(c)(2); Chi., Ill., Municipal Code 2-173-
005; S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12.H; N.M. Exec. Order No. 2005-019 (Apr. 7, 2005); 
L.A. Police Dep’t, Special Order No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979), http://assets.lapdonline. 
org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf. 
34 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. Congress had twice previously tried to enact anti-
sanctuary measures. See S. 1607, 103d Cong. § 725 (1993); H.R. 5255, 102d Cong. 
(1992); see also Rudolph W. Giuliani, Address, Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 4 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 165, 168 (1996) 
(“As I have said, this idea [revoking noncooperation ordinances] has long been 
debated in Congress and there have been at least two other attempts to revoke [New 
York City’s Executive Order 124], both of which have been defeated.”). 
35 § 434, 110 Stat. at 2275. 
36 Id. 
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any State or local law, ordinance, executive order, policy, constitu-
tional provision, or decision of any Federal or State court that pro-
hibits or in any way restricts any communication between State and 
local officials and the INS. The conferees believe that immigration 
law enforcement is as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law 
enforcement, and that illegal aliens do not have the right to remain 
in the United States undetected and unapprehended.37 
A similar measure was enacted several weeks later as part of the Ille-
gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA). This provision, IIRIRA § 642(a), entitled “Communication Be-
tween Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service,” is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and provides: 
(a) In General 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, 
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not pro-
hibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from 
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration sta-
tus, lawful or unlawful, of any individual. 
(b) Additional Authority of Government Entities 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, 
no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, 
State, or local government entity from doing any of the following 
with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful 
or unlawful, of any individual: 
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such 
information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
(2) Maintaining such information. 
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or 
local government entity. 
(c) Obligation to Respond to Inquiries 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an in-
quiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to 
verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any indi-
vidual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose author-
ized by law, by providing the requested verification or status infor-
mation.38 
IIRIRA § 642, while also focusing on intergovernmental communica-
tion, included broader language encompassing a greater array of gov-
 
37 H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
38 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 342, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707. 
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ernment actors and protected activities, as well as an explicit mandate to 
federal immigration authorities to respond to inquiries about immigra-
tion status from federal, state, and local government agencies. A Senate 
committee report accompanying the legislation states, in reference to 
this section, that it: 
Prohibits any restriction on the exchange of information between 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and any Federal, State, 
or local agency regarding a person’s immigration status. Effective 
immigration law enforcement requires a cooperative effort between 
all levels of government. The acquisition, maintenance, and ex-
change of immigration-related information by State and local agen-
cies is consistent with, and potentially of considerable assistance to, 
the Federal regulation of immigration and the achieving of the 
purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.39 
The text and commentary to both anti-sanctuary provisions make 
clear that these provisions were intended to facilitate immigration-related 
information sharing in support of federal immigration enforcement ef-
forts. In the context of the Welfare Reform Act, § 1644 formed part of a 
concerted effort to make drastic cuts in federal welfare programs by limit-
ing access by all non-citizens, not just unauthorized immigrants, to feder-
al public benefits.40 Indeed, eliminating access to benefit programs by le-
gal permanent residents alone would result in the lion’s share of the 
budget savings wrought by the Welfare Reform Act.41 Although the Wel-
fare Reform Act most dramatically impacted access to public benefits for 
green card holders, it also reiterated and formalized the ineligibility of 
undocumented immigrants for virtually all public-benefit programs in 
the United States.42 In that vein, § 1644 confirmed Congress’s intent to 
 
39 S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996). 
40 Dolores Acevedo-Garcia et al., U.S. Comm’n on Immigr. Reform, Impact 
of Federal Welfare Reform on Immigrants 1 (July 28, 1997), https://www. 
utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/respapers/iot-jul97.pdf (“Title IV of [the Welfare Reform Act] 
sets forth new requirements on the states to discontinue benefits and deny eligibility 
for federal, state and local welfare programs to specific classes of immigrants, 
including qualified immigrants, non-qualified immigrants, and illegal immigrants.”). 
41 Audrey Singer, Welfare Reform and Immigrants: A Policy Review, in Immigrants, 
Welfare Reform, and the Poverty of Policy 21, 25 (Philip Kretsedemas & Ana 
Aparicio eds., 2004) (“The welfare law was projected to save the federal government 
$54.1 billion over six years. The largest savings—$23.8 billion or 44 percent of the net 
savings—was to come from slashing benefits to legal permanent residents (green card 
holders). Legal immigrants, including those who were participating in the programs 
at the time the law became effective, became ineligible for most federally funded 
programs.”). 
42 Excluded from benefits under the Welfare Reform Act are “undocumented 
immigrants, asylum applicants, immigrants formerly considered ‘permanently 
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ensure that all non-citizens, but perhaps especially unauthorized immi-
grants, accessing or thinking about accessing public benefits would be 
subject to information sharing with and, ultimately, enforcement action 
by federal immigration authorities.43 
But the scope of § 1644 was not limited to the public-benefit arena. 
Section 1644 banned restrictions on immigration-related information 
sharing by any state or local government entity, including existing state 
and local restrictions on information sharing related to law enforcement, 
education, and public health functions. Of the more than two dozen 
sanctuary measures then in place, a number of them contained re-
strictions on sharing immigration-related information with federal immi-
gration authorities that would be prohibited by § 1644.44 
It is also evident that in enacting § 1644, Congress perceived that 
certain state and local measures restricting disclosure of immigration-
related information had been adopted in order to avoid the loss of fund-
ing under existing federal laws that specifically prohibited disclosure of 
certain categories of protected information, including immigration status 
information: 
The confidentiality provisions of various State statutes may prohibit 
disclosure of immigration status obtained under them. Some Fed-
eral laws, including the Family Education Rights and Protection 
Act, may deny funds to certain State and local agencies that disclose 
a protected individual’s immigration status. Various localities have 
enacted laws preventing local officials from disclosing the immigra-
tion status of individuals to INS.45 
The conference report specifically mentions the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which restricts and penalizes unauthor-
ized disclosure of educational records.46 However, other federal laws al-
ready in place in 1996 and still in effect today also prohibit disclosure of 
certain types of confidential information except in limited circumstances, 
and impose penalties, including loss of federal funding for unauthorized 
disclosures. In addition to educational records, federal law restricts or 
 
residing under color of law’ . . . as well as those with temporary status such as students 
and tourists.” Id. at 23. 
43 See id. at 26 (“For their part, immigrants had to confront their precarious place 
in American society. Many immigrants felt vulnerable, including those who had never 
participated in U.S. welfare programs.”). 
44 See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t, Special Order No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979), http://assets. 
lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf; see also McDonnell, supra note 30 (“The 
trailblazing LAPD policy, enacted after intense community pressure, generally 
prevents officers from quizzing anyone about their immigration status, checking with 
the INS or turning suspects accused of minor violations over to immigration 
authorities. (The major exception involves those who commit serious crimes.)”). 
45 H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 391 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
46 See infra Part IV.B. 
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prohibits disclosure of protected information including health records,47 
census records,48 driver’s license records,49 and tax records,50 all of which 
might include information relating to immigration status. As discussed in 
Part IV, infra, state and local entities and officials covered by the federal 
anti-sanctuary statutes would undoubtedly also be subject to these federal 
privacy protections. 
The anti-sanctuary provision in IIRIRA, like its counterpart in the 
Welfare Reform Act, formed part of a broader legislative effort intended 
to prevent non-citizens, particularly unauthorized immigrants, from ac-
cessing government benefits and services.51 Beyond that, IIRIRA was de-
signed to crack down on unauthorized immigration through tighter bor-
der controls, expansion of detention capacity, streamlined removal 
procedures, employer sanctions, and penalties for fraud and abuse in asy-
lum and parole procedures.52 Faced with increasing levels of unauthor-
ized immigration,53 Congress sought to expand enforcement capacity by 
encouraging information sharing and other forms of cooperation within 
the federal government and between the federal government and state 
and local governments.54 While the text of § 1373 clearly expresses Con-
gress’s intent to encourage open communication of immigration-related 
information among all levels and branches of government, the legislative 
commentary also reveals Congress’s frustration with certain “Americans,” 
 
47 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d–6 (2012). 
48 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(2012). 
49 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012). 
50 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012). 
51 See S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 3 (1996) (“The committee bill is needed to address 
the high current levels of illegal immigration . . . and the substantial burden imposed 
on the taxpayers of this country as the result of aliens’ use of welfare and other 
government benefits.”). 
52 Id. at 2. 
53 See id. at 3 (“No matter how successful Congress might be in crafting a set of 
immigration laws that would—in theory—lead to the most long-term benefits to the 
American people, such benefits will not actually occur if those laws cannot be 
enforced. Unfortunately, U.S. immigration law is violated on a massive scale.”). 
54 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707; see also § 133, 110 Stat. at 3009-563 
(authorizing the Attorney General to enter into written agreements with a state, or 
any political subdivision of a state, to permit specially trained state officers to arrest 
and detain aliens); § 623, 110 Stat. at 3009-697 (requiring the Attorney General to 
release information provided to the INS by an alien in connection with an 
application for legalization or the special-agricultural-work program in order to assist 
law enforcement authorities with a criminal investigation or to assist in the 
identification of a deceased person); § 656, 110 Stat. at 3009-716 to -719 (establishing 
federal standards for birth certificates and state-issued driver’s licenses and grants for 
states to facilitate the matching of birth and death records). 
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including members of the federal judiciary, who were perceived as not 
fully supporting federal efforts to enforce immigration law.55 Consequent-
ly, IIRIRA’s anti-sanctuary provision is more expansive than that in § 1644 
of the Welfare Reform Act, applying not just to state and local govern-
ment entities but to federal entities as well, and protecting communica-
tion of immigration-related information among non-federal entities as 
well as with federal immigration authorities.56 Additionally, § 1373 con-
tains a provision which further encourages immigration-related infor-
mation sharing by requiring federal immigration officials to respond to 
communications from federal, state, and local government agencies seek-
ing information about or verification of the immigration status of any in-
dividual for any purpose authorized by law.57 
Almost immediately after they were enacted, it was understood that 
§§ 1644 and 1373 were intended to target so-called sanctuary measures 
promulgated by states and localities in order to ensure that their undoc-
umented immigrant residents were not deterred from reporting crimes, 
seeking medical care, or enrolling in public schools out of fear of immi-
gration enforcement.58 In New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, 
where long-standing policies prohibiting disclosure of immigration-
related information were in place, there was concern about the impact 
that the federal anti-sanctuary provisions would have on those communi-
ties.59 Most understood the anti-sanctuary provisions as invalidating state 
 
55 See S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 7 (“At this point, there is a fundamental committee 
intent that should be clearly expressed—an intent that should be taken into account 
in the interpretation of every provision of this bill. The committee intends that aliens 
within the jurisdiction of this country be required to fully obey all State and Federal 
laws—including the immigration laws. Some Americans appear to be ambivalent 
about the enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This includes a 
number of judges, perhaps reflecting a tension they feel between their duty to apply 
the law and their inclination to be humane toward those seeking a better life in this 
country, in accordance with our immigrant heritage. For example, while the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that the making of immigration policy is reserved to 
the political branches under our constitutional system and should be largely immune 
from judicial control, and that relief from deportation may be left to the unfettered 
discretion of the Attorney General, the Court on other occasions has characterized 
deportation as a grave penalty and suggested that statutory ambiguities should be 
resolved in favor of the alien. If the United States is to have an immigration policy 
that is both fair and effective, the law and the commitment of those with the duty to 
apply or enforce it must be clear. There should be no confusion about the intent of 
Congress that U.S. immigration law be fully binding on all persons at or within the 
borders of this country. This is a nation governed by law, and the law includes the 
immigration statutes and the regulations promulgated thereunder.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
56 8 U.S.C § 1373(b) (2012). 
57 Id. § 1373(c). 
58 See McDonnell, supra note 30. 
59 Id.; see, e.g., Giuliani, supra note 34, at 165 (describing § 1644 as an attempt to 
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and local measures that prohibited public agencies and employees from 
sharing immigration information.60 However, some public officials and 
news reports initially understood the federal statutes as mandating re-
porting of immigration information to the federal government.61 What-
ever initial uncertainty or misunderstanding may have existed about the 
meaning and effect of the federal anti-sanctuary provisions, it does not 
appear that any state or municipality voluntarily rescinded or revised an 
existing sanctuary measure upon their enactment. Perhaps because it was 
unclear how or whether the anti-sanctuary measures would be enforced, 
most sanctuary jurisdictions seemed to take a “wait and see” approach.62 
One jurisdiction, New York City, was unwilling to wait and on September 
11, 1996, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani announced that the City of New York 
would challenge the anti-sanctuary provisions in court.63 
III. THE FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY PROVISIONS IN THE BATTLE 
AGAINST SANCTUARY 
Following the enactment of the anti-sanctuary provisions, some pre-
dicted dire consequences for public safety and health in communities 
where sanctuary provisions were then in place. 64 Others applauded the 
measures and eagerly awaited the opportunity to exercise this apparently 
 
reverse a New York City executive order “in existance since 1988 stating that New 
York City will create a zone of protection for illegal and undocumented immigrants 
who are seeking the protection of the police, or seeking medical services because they 
are sick, or attempting to or actually putting their children in public schools so they 
can be educated”); see also 142 Cong. Rec. S10712–13 (daily ed. Sept 17, 1996) 
(statement of Senator Moynihan) (“[S]ection 434 . . . poses a serious threat to health 
and safety in New York City and elsewhere.”). 
60 See McDonnell, supra note 30 (“The new welfare statute expressly voids federal, 
state and local laws prohibiting state and local agencies from exchanging information 
with the INS.”). 
61 See id. (quoting Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan saying “I have a big 
problem making schools and local police departments the ones who are responsible 
for policing illegal immigration.”). 
62 See, e.g., id. (“Until the matter is clarified, LAPD officials have no plans to alter 
their policy of generally not inquiring about people’s immigration status . . . . ‘We do 
not want to discourage the community from coming forward.’”). 
63 David Firestone, Giuliani to Sue over Provision on Welfare, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 
1996, at B1. 
64 David Firestone, Mayoral Order on Immigrants Is Struck Down, N.Y. Times, July 19, 
1997, at 21 (“Last September, in announcing that he would sue the Federal 
Government over the provision, the Mayor said that ending the executive order 
would ‘create chaos in New York City.’ Without an iron-clad guarantee that they 
would not be turned in, illegal immigrants might refuse to send their children to 
school, report crimes to the police or seek treatment for contagious diseases, he 
said.”). 
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unrestricted authority to share information with federal immigration au-
thorities.65 Nevertheless, there was a great deal of uncertainty about how 
the provisions would be enforced,66 and some opponents of the anti-
sanctuary measures predicted that the federal government would never 
enforce the laws, that their only purpose was to create fear and appre-
hension (and ultimately self-deportation) in immigrant communities 
about increased enforcement at all levels of government.67 As it turns out, 
the federal government never took affirmative steps to enforce the anti-
sanctuary provisions or to invalidate a state or local sanctuary law. Even 
so, §§ 1644 and 1373 have been at the center of numerous legal chal-
lenges involving sub-federal sanctuary measures in the almost two dec-
ades since they became law. 
A. City of New York v. United States: §§ 1644 and 1373 Survive a 
Constitutional Challenge 
In August 1989, Edward Koch, then Mayor of New York City, issued 
Executive Order 124. The order, entitled “City Policy Concerning Al-
iens,” was subsequently reissued by Mayor David Dinkins and Mayor Giu-
liani,68 and provides: 
Section 2. Confidentiality of Information Respecting Aliens. 
 
65 McDonnell, supra note 30 (quoting California Governor Pete Wilson regarding 
his plan to immediately implement the mandates of the anti-sanctuary provisions: 
“We fully intend to use the new authority that has been conferred on the state and 
local governments to deny services to those who are illegally in the country and 
report them to the INS, hopefully for return back to their country of origin”); see also 
Michael Grunwald, Illegal Alien List Dilemma for Reformers; Overhaul Mandates INS Access 
to Names of Welfare Recipients, Bos. Globe, Dec. 12, 1996, at A1 (quoting Massachusetts 
Governor William F. Weld’s welfare commissioner regarding new requirements that 
state and local agencies report immigration-related information about individuals 
seeking welfare benefits: “I don’t have any problem releasing this information[.] . . . 
These people are in this country illegally. I don’t see why we shouldn’t let the INS 
know about that.”). 
66 See McDonnell, supra note 30 (“[T]he law contains no mechanisms to enforce 
the provision, and it remains unclear what kind of enforcement, if any, would 
emerge.”). 
67 Giuliani, supra note 34, at 169 (“So it seems to us that this provision is another 
‘not-real’ attempt to control immigration in a useful way, but creates a sense of fear as 
well as disincentives because the reality is that all the names, if we are required to 
turn them in, will just be added to a very big pile. The overwhelming majority of 
people will face a type of Russian roulette where some will be deported and some will 
not be deported. So you create this catastrophic setting, but in no way are you 
affecting the number of people, at least the present population of illegal and 
undocumented immigrants, that are here.”). 
68 See Hing, supra note 12, at 259. 
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a. No City officer or employee shall transmit information respecting 
any alien to federal immigration authorities unless 
(1) such officer’s or employee’s agency is required by law to dis-
close information respecting such alien, or 
(2) such agency has been authorized, in writing signed by such al-
ien, to verify such alien’s immigration status, or 
(3) such alien is suspected by such agency of engaging in criminal 
activity, including an attempt to obtain public assistance benefits 
through the use of fraudulent documents. 
b. Each agency shall designate one or more officers or employees 
who shall be responsible for receiving reports from such agency’s 
line workers on aliens suspected of criminal activity and for deter-
mining, on a case by case basis, what action, if any, to take on such 
reports. No such determination shall be made by any line worker, 
nor shall any line worker transmit information respecting any alien 
directly to federal immigration authorities. 
c. Enforcement agencies, including the Police Department and the 
Department of Correction, shall continue to cooperate with federal 
authorities in investigating and apprehending aliens suspected of 
criminal activity. However, such agencies shall not transmit to fed-
eral authorities information respecting any alien who is the victim 
of a crime.69 
The commentary issued with the order made clear that the City’s 
goal in issuing the order was to encourage all residents, including unau-
thorized immigrants, to utilize health, police and educational services, as 
a matter of public welfare.70 It also articulated the City’s understanding 
that immigration enforcement was a federal obligation and that the City 
was not obliged, except in limited circumstances, to provide immigration-
related information to federal immigration authorities.71 In balancing 
 
69 N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124, § 2 (Aug. 7, 1989), http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/records/pdf/executive_orders/1989EO124.PDF. 
70 Id. at 3 (“Many services provided by New York City, including education and 
police protection, are available to all City residents regardless of their citizenship or 
immigration status. However, many aliens who reside in the City fail to make use of 
such services, largely from fear that any contact with a government agency will bring 
them to the attention of federal immigration authorities. It is to the disadvantage of 
all City residents if some who live in the City are uneducated, inadequately protected 
from crime, or untreated for illness. Regardless of their immigration status, aliens 
should not be discouraged from utilizing those City services to which they are 
entitled. On the contrary, the public welfare requires that they be encouraged to do 
so. Yet many aliens will continue to avoid City agencies as long as they fear that they 
will be reported to federal immigration authorities.”). 
71 Id. (“Federal law places full responsibility for immigration control on the 
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this understanding with the City’s interest in protecting public health 
and safety, the order prohibited disclosure of immigration-related infor-
mation except (1) where otherwise required by law, (2) where the indi-
vidual involved consented to the disclosure, or (3) where the individual 
was suspected of criminal activity.72 The order also required that only des-
ignated city officials or employees would be authorized to make a deci-
sion to report immigration information to federal authorities.73 In this 
way, the order prevented ad hoc reporting by city employees and allowed 
designated city officials to decide when and whether to report infor-
mation on a case-by-case basis. By limiting the discretion of individual 
employees to share immigration-related information, the order protected 
unauthorized immigrant residents from the uncertainty and fear of being 
reported to immigration authorities whenever they came in contact with 
city employees or accessed a city service.74 
In early October 1996, as Mayor Giuliani had promised, the City of 
New York filed a lawsuit bringing a facial challenge to the constitutionali-
ty of §§ 1644 and 1373. New York City alleged that the anti-sanctuary pro-
visions violated principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment75 and 
Guarantee Clause76 of the United States Constitution because they 
“(1) . . . directly prohibit States and localities from engaging in the cen-
tral sovereign process of passing laws or otherwise determining policy; 
and (2) they usurp States’ and local governments’ administration of core 
functions of government, including the provision of police protection 
 
federal government. With limited exceptions, the City therefore has no legal 
obligation to report any alien to federal authorities. The executive order, in 
recognition of this lack of obligation and the importance of providing the services 
covered herein, requires City agencies to preserve the confidentiality of all 
information respecting law-abiding aliens to the extent permitted by law.”). 
72 Id. § 2(a). 
73 Id. § 2(b). 
74 See Giuliani, supra note 34, at 168 (“The illegal and undocumented parent 
seeking to put her child in school would not know if a teacher would report her to 
the INS or not. So [§ 1644] would have precisely the impact the order intended to 
avoid. It would make illegal and undocumented immigrants wary of contact with the 
government for basic services they need to protect themselves as well as the rest of the 
population.”); see also Firestone, supra note 64, at 22 (“[T]he Mayor said the welfare 
law provision would have the same effect as requiring teachers to report illegal 
immigrants, because the immigrants, not knowing which of the city’s 200,000 
employees might decide to report them, would assume that any employee might turn 
them in.”). 
75 U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”). 
76 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
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and regulation of their own workforces.”77 New York City first argued that 
the anti-sanctuary provisions violated the Tenth Amendment by forbid-
ding state and local governments from controlling how they use immigra-
tion-related information gathered in the course of official business.78 
While the City did not dispute that the federal government has plenary 
power to legislate in the area of immigration, it contended that the 
Tenth Amendment prohibited the federal government from exercising 
that power in a way that prevented states and local governments from en-
acting laws and policies that restrict their employees from cooperating 
with federal immigration.79 The City argued that by prohibiting the City 
from ordering City employees to keep immigration-related information 
confidential, the anti-sanctuary provisions compelled the City to bear the 
political responsibility for ad hoc immigration reporting by City officials 
that is compelled by the federal government.80 The City relied on New 
York v. United States81 and Printz v. United States82 to argue that the City had 
the authority to choose to not participate in a federal regulatory program 
and to prohibit city employees from voluntarily providing information to 
federal immigration authorities.83 In New York and Printz, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the federal government could neither compel 
states to enact legislation to enforce a federal program,84 nor coerce 
states into enforcing a federal law.85 
 
77 City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 
179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). 
78 Id. at 794. 
79 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1999). 
80 City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 794. 
81 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
82 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
83 See Appellants’ Brief at 41, City of New York, 179 F.3d 29 (No. 97-6182) (“When 
Congress desires to regulate in areas where it has authority under the Constitution, it 
must do so directly and cannot conscript State and local governments to do its 
bidding.” (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 935)); see also id. at 43 (“While Congress, short of 
outright coercion, may encourage a State to conform to federal policy choices, the 
residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will 
comply.” (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 167–68)). 
84 New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (“As an initial matter, Congress may not simply 
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to 
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’” (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))). 
85 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress 
cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States’ officers directly. The 
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”). 
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the City’s reli-
ance on Printz and New York. The court distinguished the 1996 anti-
sanctuary provisions from the laws at issue in Printz and New York, which 
“conscripted states (or their officers) to enact or administer federal regu-
latory programs” and reallocated federal enforcement and administrative 
responsibilities to the states, thus “diminish[ing] the political accounta-
bility of both state and federal officers.”86 With regard to the anti-
sanctuary provisions, the Second Circuit found that Congress had not 
forced state and local governments to enact or administer any federal 
regulatory program, nor conscripted them into federal government ser-
vice.87 Indeed, the court found that the anti-sanctuary statutes did not di-
rectly compel states or localities to do anything, but rather prohibited 
state and local governments “only from directly restricting the voluntary 
exchange of immigration information” with federal immigration authori-
ties.88 The court found that the Tenth Amendment did not give states or 
localities “an untrammeled right to forbid all voluntary cooperation with 
particular federal programs,” pointing out that a “system of dual sover-
eignties cannot work without informed, extensive, and cooperative inter-
action of a voluntary nature between sovereign systems for the mutual 
benefit of each system.”89 
New York City’s second argument was that the anti-sanctuary provi-
sions improperly interfered with the City’s control of confidential infor-
mation gathered in the course of official business and of the actions of its 
employees in connection with that information. The City argued that the 
ability to establish policies that assure access to vital services by all resi-
dents, including unauthorized immigrants, was central to its police pow-
er.90 Depriving the City of the ability to guarantee residents that infor-
mation about immigration status would be kept confidential was, the City 
argued, an unconstitutional interference with the City’s authority to “pre-
serve public order and to protect the health, safety and well-being of its 
residents.”91 With respect to the City’s ability to control employee disclo-
 
86 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1999). 
87 Id. at 35. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Appellants’ Brief at 24, City of New York, 179 F.3d 29 (No. 97-6182) (“The 
exercise of police powers to protect the health, safety, good order and general 
welfare of the people is the chief purpose of local government, and has never been 
surrendered to the federal government. Police powers are inherent in the States and 
their political subdivisions, reserved to them by the Constitution, and necessary to 
their existence as separate and independent governments.”). 
91 Id. at 37; see also id. at 29 (“This executive order was issued to protect the 
health, safety and well-being of all New York City residents by assuring the 
confidentiality of law-abiding immigrants, many of whom were not seeking medical 
attention, reporting crimes, or sending their children to school for ‘fear that any 
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sure of confidential immigration-related information, the City contended 
that such information, gathered by City employees as part of their official 
duties, was the property of the City and that the mayor had the authority 
to “establish policy prohibiting City employees, who do not have the ex-
pertise or authority to determine immigration status, to make ad hoc de-
cisions regarding that status . . . [and to] forbid City employees from us-
ing City time and resources to report law-abiding immigrants to INS.”92 
The nature of state sovereignty depends, the City contended, on the 
power of local government to set policy and to control internal processes 
and procedures, including “the ability to control City employees and to 
assign their duties.”93 Without such authority, the City argued, it would 
not be possible to maintain the “open and honest communications . . . 
essential to the preservation of health, prevention of crime and the pro-
tection of the public welfare.”94 Executive Order 124 was, according to 
the City, a legitimate exercise of the City’s police powers, and this power 
was not subordinate to the federal government’s authority over immigra-
tion.95 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the City on two points. First, the 
court agreed with the City that without an expectation of privacy the City 
could be hindered in obtaining information necessary to a wide variety of 
city functions, and that preserving confidentiality could also require re-
stricting the disclosure of such information by City employees.96 The 
court also agreed with the City that §§ 1644 and 1373 did in fact interfere 
with the City’s control over confidential information and its employees’ 
use of that information.97 However, the court found that the City had 
 
contact with a government agency will bring them to the attention of federal 
immigration authorities.’” (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124, at 3 (Aug. 7, 
1989), http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/executive_orders/1989EO124.pdf)). 
92 Id. at 37. 
93 Id. at 38 (“Whatever the outer limits of state sovereignty may be, it surely 
encompasses the right to set the duties of office for state-created officials and to 
regulate the internal affairs of governmental bodies[.]” (quoting Koog v. United 
States, 79 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1996))). 
94 Id. at 37. 
95 Id. at 32 (“The People of the States did not confer authority upon Congress to 
subordinate their health, safety and well-being to the regulation of immigrants in 
accordance with congressionally-imposed rules. No matter how powerful the federal 
interest may be, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to 
conduct its business in a fashion such as to inflict injury upon the public, or to 
obstruct the operations of municipal government directed at protecting the public. 
The power of Congress to regulate immigration was not intended as an authority to 
control local governments in the exercise of their police powers over local matters, 
always existing and carefully reserved to them in the Tenth Amendment.”). 
96 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999). 
97 Id. 
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failed to show that the anti-sanctuary provisions constituted an impermis-
sible intrusion on the City’s authority to control the use of confidential 
information and to determine how such information will be handled by 
City employees.98 In particular, because Executive Order 124 was the only 
city policy the City claimed was disrupted by §§ 1644 and 1373, and be-
cause Executive Order 124 did not prevent voluntary sharing of immigra-
tion-related information with anyone other than federal immigration 
agencies and officers, the court concluded that Executive Order 124 was 
not integral to the functions of city government.99 The court applied a 
balancing test between the anti-sanctuary statutes’ interference with the 
City’s interests and the executive order’s interference with federal policy 
and decided that, in the context of the City’s facial challenge, the anti-
sanctuary provisions were valid.100 
In City of New York, the fate of state and local sanctuary provisions 
that prohibit voluntary immigration-related information sharing with 
federal immigration authorities was sealed. Such provisions are preempt-
ed by the anti-sanctuary statutes.101 However, the court’s opinion in this 
case left open a number of questions with respect to the interaction of 
the anti-sanctuary statutes and sub-federal sanctuary provisions. First, the 
court’s opinion in City of New York explicitly left open the question of 
whether the federal anti-sanctuary provisions would survive a challenge in 
the context of a more generalized city policy protecting confidential in-
formation that included but was not limited to immigration infor-
mation.102 In the wake of the Second Circuit’s decision, the City of New 
York revoked Executive Order 124, putting in place a new order which 
incorporated privacy protections for immigration-related information in-
to a more generalized privacy policy that applies to a broader category of 
information in a variety of contexts.103 To emphasize the importance of 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 36–37. 
100 Id. at 37 (“On its face, [the Executive Order] singles out a particular federal 
policy for non-cooperation while allowing City employees to share freely the 
information in question with the rest of the world. It imposes a policy of no-voluntary-
cooperation that does not protect confidential information generally but does 
operate to reduce the effectiveness of a federal policy.”). 
101 Anne B. Chandler, Why Is the Policeman Asking for My Visa? The Future of 
Federalism and Immigration Enforcement, 15 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 209, 214–15 
(2008). But see Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 
161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 178 (2012) (“[F]ederal demands for information should be 
considered prohibited commandeering. In all important respects, the 
commandeering of the states’ information-gathering services is indistinguishable 
from the commandeering of other law enforcement services.”).  
102 City of New York, 179 F.3d at 37. 
103 N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 41, §§ 1–2 (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/eo-41.pdf (defining confidential information to 
include sexual orientation, status as a sexual assault victim, tax record information, 
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confidentiality to the city’s essential functions, the preamble to the new 
executive order incorporated language tracking almost verbatim the Sec-
ond Circuit’s acknowledgement in New York v. United States of the sub-
stantial burdens that could be placed on the city by the anti-sanctuary 
statutes: 
Whereas, the obtaining of pertinent information, which is essential 
to the performance of a wide variety of government functions, may 
in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of con-
fidentiality is not preserved, and preserving confidentiality in turn 
requires that governments regulate the use of such information by 
their employees . . . .104 
The court’s decision in City of New York also did not address sanctuary 
provisions that prohibit the gathering, rather than the sharing of confi-
dential immigration-related information. A number of jurisdictions, in-
cluding New York City in the aftermath of the court’s decision here, have 
put in place “don’t ask” provisions, presumably with the purpose of limit-
ing the collection of immigration-related information that would be sub-
ject to the voluntary disclosures encouraged by §§ 1644 and 1373.105 New 
York City’s Executive Order 41, still in effect today, no longer prohibits 
immigration-related information sharing but instead prohibits city em-
ployees, except in limited circumstances, from inquiring about immigra-
tion status.106 
Finally, despite New York City’s serious concerns that the anti-
sanctuary provisions deterred unauthorized immigrant residents from 
seeking health services or sending children to school, City of New York v. 
United States did not address the question, discussed infra Part III, of 
whether the anti-sanctuary provisions permit voluntary disclosure of im-
migration-related information that is protected by other federal confi-
dentiality provisions. In other words, even if §§ 1644 and 1373 block state 
and local governments from prohibiting sharing of immigration-related 
information with federal immigration authorities, are there other legal 
prohibitions on information sharing that render such disclosures unlaw-
ful? 
 
immigration status, and status as recipient of public assistance; and prohibiting 
disclosure, with certain exceptions, to anyone, not just to federal immigration 
authorities as in Executive Order 124). 
104 Id. § 1. 
105 Id. § 3 (prohibiting inquiries into immigration status except where necessary 
to determine eligibility for public benefits or as required by law); id. § 4(c) (declaring 
policy of not inquiring regarding the immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, 
and others assisting an investigation). 
106 Id. § 3. 
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The answers to these questions would come in the years following 
City of New York v. United States in the course of subsequent legal challeng-
es to state and municipal sanctuary provisions. 
B. Defining the Limits of the Anti-Sanctuary Provisions 
Following the court’s decision in New York v. United States, it would be 
several years before any other court considered the meaning and scope 
of §§ 1644 and 1373 in the context of a sub-federal sanctuary provision or 
practice. Though there were a number of sanctuary laws and policies al-
ready in place in 1996, that number continued to grow in the aftermath 
of IIRIRA’s call for enhanced state and local involvement in immigration 
enforcement107 and the release of a controversial Department of Justice 
opinion declaring that local police had “inherent authority” to enforce 
federal immigration laws.108 In response to this increased pressure to en-
gage them in immigration enforcement activities, dozens of cities, states 
and law enforcement agencies adopted policies making clear that immi-
gration enforcement was not their responsibility.109 This surge in sanctu-
ary policies led, unsurprisingly, to new legal challenges. 
1. Claims for Damages Under §§ 1644 and 1373 
Among the first legal challenges involving the federal anti-sanctuary 
provisions were several seeking damages for injuries to private citizens 
 
107 In addition to barring states and localities from imposing restrictions on 
immigration-related information sharing through § 1373, IIRIRA contained a 
provision establishing a program through which local law enforcement agencies 
could enter in to agreements with ICE that enabled local officers to be trained to 
enforce federal immigration law under ICE’s supervision. Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-
546, 3009-563 to -564 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)). 
108 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y General, to the Att’y General 
(Apr. 3, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft relied on this memo to support a request for 
assistance from state and local police in the enforcement of civil immigration 
violations. This opinion was a reversal of a long-standing DOJ position that state and 
local police could not enforce non-criminal provisions of federal immigration law. 
The change in position caused concern among immigrant advocates and law 
enforcement agencies who believed that increased involvement in immigration 
enforcement would have a detrimental impact on public safety by deterring 
immigrants from cooperating with or seeking assistance from local law enforcement. 
See Secret Immigration Enforcement Memo Exposed, ACLU (Sept. 7, 2005), https://www. 
aclu.org/news/secret-immigration-enforcement-memo-exposed. 
109 See Nat’l Immigration Forum, Immigration Law Enforcement by State 
and Local Police 3 (Aug. 2007), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/ 
default/files/docs/EnforcementbyStateandLocalPolice-08-07.pdf; see also Nat’l 
Immigration Law Ctr., Inclusive Policies Advance Dramatically in the States 
14–15 (Oct. 2013), http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=963. 
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claiming that state or local governments had acted in violation of §§ 1644 
and 1373. In Lewis v. City of Kimball, a federal court in Nebraska consid-
ered the petitioner’s claim that her termination from her job as a police 
officer in retaliation for her cooperation with federal immigration offi-
cials violated § 1373.110 Plaintiff did not allege that any defendant prohib-
ited or restricted her from maintaining or exchanging relevant infor-
mation in violation of § 1373. Instead she alleged that the defendants 
violated § 1373 by terminating her after several local employers com-
plained to city officials about enforcement actions conducted by ICE 
against their employees in connection with investigations conducted by 
plaintiff.111 That is, the city prohibited her from sharing immigration-
related information in the course of her work as a police officer by firing 
her. The district court dismissed the complaint, agreeing with defendants 
that, even if plaintiff’s allegations were true, § 1373 did not provide her 
with a remedy: “[T]he fact that a federal statute has been violated and 
some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of 
action in favor of that person.”112 The court found that § 1373 did not 
expressly provide for a private right of action and that a private right of 
action was not implicit in the statute. The court listed four factors tradi-
tionally considered by courts in determining whether a statute implies a 
private right of action: 
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted,”—that is, does the statute create a federal right 
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative 
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the leg-
islative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, 
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an 
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?113 
Noting that these four factors were not entitled to equal weight in 
the calculation, and that the critical determination was whether Congress 
intended to afford a private right of action,114 the court concluded that, 
because § 1373 did not expressly provide for a private right of action and 
the legislative history did not suggest in any way that Congress intended 
to do so, a private right of action under § 1373 did not exist.115 
 
110 See Lewis v. City of Kimball, No. 4:06CV3084, 2006 WL 2375479, at *2 (D. Neb. 
Aug. 14, 2006). 
111 Id. at *1. 
112 Id. at *5 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979)). 
113 Id. (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688 n.9 (citations omitted)). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (“In other words, even if it is consistent with the underlying purpose of 
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In Doe v. New York City, the plaintiff sought damages in connection 
with a rape and robbery on property owned and operated by the Metro-
politan Transit Authority.116 Among the suspects charged and ultimately 
convicted of the crime were four unauthorized immigrants. The plaintiff 
alleged that city officials were aware of homeless squatters, including her 
attackers, who lived in an encampment near the railroad tracks where the 
assault took place but had failed to report the presence of unauthorized 
immigrants to federal immigration officials in violation of § 1373.117 She 
also alleged that several of her undocumented immigrant attackers had 
been previously arrested by New York City police but had been released 
pursuant to the city’s sanctuary policy, amended after the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision in City of New York v. United States.118 The court dismissed 
the complaint, finding that although § 1373 prohibited state and local 
governments from placing restrictions on reporting immigration-related 
information to federal immigration authorities, it did not impose an af-
firmative duty on them to make such reports.119 The court noted that 
§ 1373 did not expressly provide for a private right of action and that a 
private right of action could be implied “only when the plaintiff is one of 
the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted and a right 
of action would be clearly in furtherance of the legislative purpose,” 
which the court found was “lacking here.”120 
In Bologna v. City and County of San Francisco, family members of three 
men murdered by an unauthorized immigrant filed a claim seeking dam-
ages and alleging that the city’s sanctuary policy was the legal cause of the 
deaths.121 In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the suspected murderer 
was a gang member and a drug trafficker known to and previously arrest-
ed by city authorities, but that he had never been reported to or turned 
 
§ 1373 to imply a private remedy in this case, and even if the enforcement of § 1373 is 
a matter of federal concern, those considerations would not outweigh the fact that 
there is absolutely no reason to conclude that Congress intended to create a private 
cause of action for violations of § 1373.”). 
116 See Doe v. City of New York, 860 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842–43 (Sup. Ct. 2008). The 
Metropolitan Transit Authority is a “public benefit corporation[] and by statute [is] 
regarded as performing a governmental function in carrying out [its] corporate 
purpose and exercising the powers granted by statute.” Id. at 844. 
117 Id. at 842–43. 
118 See Peggy O’Hare, Accused Killer Helped by HPD’s ‘Hands-off’ Proviso, 
Hous. Chron. (Mar. 8, 2003), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/ 
article/Accused-killer-helped-by-HPD-s-hands-off-proviso-2099827.php (discussing the 
circumstances giving rise to Doe). 
119 Doe, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 844. 
120 Id. at 844–45 (citing Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d. 18, 20 
(N.Y. 1989); CPC Int’l, Inc. v McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 1987); 
Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner., 451 N.E.2d 459, 463 (N.Y. 1983)). 
121 See Bologna v. City & County of San Francisco, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 409 (Ct. 
App. 2011). 
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over to immigration officials because of the sanctuary policy. According 
to plaintiffs, the sanctuary policy caused the defendants to violate § 1373, 
and that statutory violation was the basis for a finding of negligence per 
se against the city.122 In dismissing plaintiffs’ claim, the court noted that 
in order to succeed on a claim of negligence per se the plaintiffs must 
show “that the harm allegedly caused is of the precise nature a statute was 
designed to prevent.”123 The court found that plaintiffs had identified 
nothing in the legislative history or the text of the statute to suggest that 
Congress intended § 1373 to protect individuals from violent crime.124 As 
a result, the court concluded plaintiffs’ tort claims could not be premised 
on § 1373. 
And in Johnson v. Hurtt, Joselyn Johnson, the widow of a slain Hou-
ston Police Officer and a Houston police officer herself, brought a claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Houston Police Department’s 
sanctuary policies restricted her “right” to communicate with federal 
immigration officials in violation of §§ 1644 and 1373.125 Johnson claimed 
that the anti-sanctuary statutes “confirm, if not create, a federal right on 
the part of local government officials such as Sergeant Johnson to share 
information with federal immigration officials without interference from 
their employers.”126 The district court disagreed, pointing out that 
“§ 1983 only provides redress for a plaintiff who asserts ‘a violation of a 
federal right, not merely a violation of federal law,’” and concluding that 
neither § 1644 nor § 1373 reflect Congress’s clear and unambiguous in-
tent to benefit the plaintiff individually.127 First, the court noted that the 
language of § 1644 speaks expressly about the exchange of information 
between ICE and state or local government entities, with no mention 
whatsoever of the application of the statute to individuals. Consequently, 
the court found that § 1644 did not convey “the sort of ‘individual enti-
tlement’ that is enforceable under § 1983.”128 With respect to § 1373, the 
court also found that Congress did not intend to “address[] any particu-
lar individual needs or concerns regarding information sharing,” but was 
instead implementing a “nationwide system of voluntary information 
 
122 Id. at 411. 
123 Id. (citing Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 968 P.2d 522, 531 (Cal. 1998)). 
124 Id. at 414. 
125 Johnson v. Hurtt, 893 F. Supp. 2d 817, 822–24 (S.D. Tex. 2012). Mrs. Johnson 
was represented in this case by Judicial Watch, Inc. See Tom Fitton, Judicial Watch Goes 
to Court, Judicial Watch: Weekly Update (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www. 
judicialwatch.org/press-room/weekly-updates/39-judicial-watch-goes-court/. 
126 Reply Brief of Appellant at 15–16, Johnson v. City of Houston, 444 F. App’x 26 
(5th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-20743). 
127 Johnson, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 837–38 (quoting Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 
475, 477 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
128 Id. at 838 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002)). 
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sharing” intended to assist federal immigration authorities with the en-
forcement of immigration laws.129 Thus the court dismissed plaintiff’s 
claims related to the anti-sanctuary statutes, finding that they did not 
confer any individual rights enforceable under § 1983.130 
2. Claims to Invalidate Sanctuary Policies Pursuant to §§ 1644 and 1373 
In addition to claims for damages, there have been various attempts 
to use the federal anti-sanctuary provisions to invalidate state and local 
sanctuary policies, claiming that they are in conflict with or preempted by 
§§ 1644 and 1373. In Fonseca v. Fong,131 a San Francisco resident and tax-
payer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the San Fran-
cisco Police Department (SFPD) was not complying with a state statute, 
§ 11369 of the California Health and Safety Code, which requires local 
law enforcement agencies to report certain individuals arrested for drug-
related crimes and believed to be aliens to federal immigration authori-
ties.132 Fonseca alleged that by “disregard[ing]” their obligations under 
that state law, the SFPD’s policies and practices violated federal law, in-
cluding § 1373(a) and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.133 
Fonseca asserted that the official policy of SFPD for implementing 
§ 11369 impermissibly restricted cooperation with federal immigration 
authorities in violation of § 1373,134 and sought an order mandating 
compliance with § 11369. 
Fonseca was represented in this action by Judicial Watch, Inc., a 
“conservative, non-partisan educational foundation” that engages in liti-
gation related to immigration and other issues in order to hold federal, 
state, and local government entities accountable.135 Judicial Watch has 
identified “illegal immigration” as an area of focus for their litigation ef-
forts, and has characterized their involvement in Fonseca and other immi-
gration-related litigation as “[o]pposing state and local illegal alien sanc-
tuary policies and extension of government benefits to aliens, and 
defending states that enforce our laws from attacks by groups who prefer 
 
129 Id. at 840. 
130 Id. 
131 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 570–71 (Ct. App. 2008). 
132 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11369 (West 2015). The statute provides: 
“Arrest of alien; notice to federal agency[.] When there is reason to believe that any 
person arrested for a violation of [California controlled-substance law] may not be a 
citizen of the United States, the arresting agency shall notify the appropriate agency 
of the United States having charge of deportation matters.”. 
133 Fonseca, 84 Cal.  Rptr. 3d at 572 & n.7, 575–76. 
134 Id. at 572 n.7 (“As we understand appellant’s position it is that, as a practical 
matter, SFPD’s official policy purporting to implement Section 11369 . . . actually 
restricts compliance with [8 U.S.C. § 1373] by SFPD officers.”). 
135 See About Judicial Watch, Judicial Watch (2015), http://www.judicialwatch. 
org/about/. 
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lawlessness.”136 By mandating compliance with § 11369, Judicial Watch 
sought, through Fonseca v. Fong, to “strike[] at the heart of the sanctuary 
movement for illegal aliens.”137 
In response to Fonseca’s petition, the City of San Francisco argued 
that § 11369, because it “serves no purpose other than promoting and fa-
cilitating enforcement of immigration laws,” was an impermissible regula-
tion of immigration preempted by federal law.138 Alternatively, the City 
claimed that they did in fact comply with § 11369 and that San Francis-
co’s City of Refuge Ordinance139 did permit the release of immigration-
related information in the circumstances required under § 11369.140 The 
state court of appeal, without deciding whether the SFPD violated its ob-
ligations under either § 11369 or 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as plaintiffs alleged, 
concluded only that § 11369 was not preempted by the Constitution or by 
federal law. The court of appeal rejected the trial court’s finding that 
§ 11369 was an impermissible regulation of immigration preempted per 
se by the federal government’s exclusive power over immigration.141 No-
tably for purposes of this discussion, while the court rejected the City’s 
preemption challenge to § 11369, it did not address the question of 
 
136 See Amicus Briefs and Litigation, Judicial Watch (2015), http://www. 
judicialwatch.org/amicus-briefs/. According to Judicial Watch, the challenge in 
Fonseca v. Fong is part of their effort to fight “rampant law-breaking resulting from the 
willful non-enforcement of laws, whether due to selective enforcement or 
institutional failure. Open law-breaking harms the public and creates a culture of 
lawlessness, which leads to increases in criminal conduct.” Id. 
137 See Fonseca v. Fong (No. CPF-07-507227)—San Francisco Sanctuary Policy, Judicial 
Watch (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/fonseca-v-fong-no-cpf-
07-507227-2/. 
138 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondents’ 
Demurrer to Petition for Writ of Ordinary Mandamus at 11–12, Fonseca, 84 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 567 (No. A120206). The City relied on the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court 
in De Canas v. Bica, for determining whether a state statute related to immigration is 
preempted. See id. at 7, 11 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). The De 
Canas test provides: First, is the state statute an impermissible regulation of 
immigration? Second, was the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to effect a 
“complete ouster of state power” with respect to the subject matter which the statute 
attempts to regulate? And third, does the state law conflict with or “stand[] as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress?” If a state statute does not survive any of the three tests, it is preempted. See 
Fonseca, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 575 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355, 357, 363). 
139 S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12H (2015). 
140 See Fonseca, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 572 n.8. 
141 Id. at 584. Relying on the three-part preemption analysis established in De 
Canas v. Bica, the court explained that “[f]or purposes of assessing whether Section 
11369 is per se preempted, the salient factor . . . is that it does not require any state 
actor to determine who is and who is not present in the United States unlawfully.” Id. 
at 583. 
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whether the City’s sanctuary policy or police department practices pursu-
ant to that policy were invalidated by the federal anti-sanctuary statutes. 
The Fonseca court merely concluded that a state law that requires city of-
ficials to report certain non-citizens arrested for drug-related crimes to 
federal authorities was not preempted by § 1373.142 Despite the limited 
scope of the court’s holding, the outcome in this case was touted as a vic-
tory by Judicial Watch: 
As a result of the appellate ruling, San Francisco must now end its 
sanctuary policy that protects aliens arrested for certain drug of-
fenses from being reported to ICE. 
. . . . 
. . . San Francisco and other sanctuary cities are not above the law. 
This court ruling exposes the lie behind the argument that state 
and local law enforcement cannot help enforce immigration laws.143 
Judicial Watch’s predictions about the fate of San Francisco’s sanctu-
ary policy were overstated, however, and in 2015 the policy challenged in 
Fonseca is still largely in place.144 
In Sturgeon v. Bratton,145 another anti-sanctuary lawsuit initiated by Ju-
dicial Watch, Harold Sturgeon, a resident of Los Angeles, brought a chal-
lenge in California state court to the validity of Special Order 40 (SO40), 
a policy of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) which reads: 
Enforcement of United States Immigration Laws. Officers shall not 
initiate police action where the objective is to discover the alien sta-
tus of a person. Officers shall neither arrest nor book persons for 
violation of Title 8, Section 1325 of the United States Immigration 
Code (Illegal Entry).146 
SO40 was adopted in 1979 and represented a significant reversal in 
LAPD practice and policy regarding unauthorized immigrants. Where 
previously LAPD officers were encouraged and in some cases mandated 
to obtain and report immigration-related information about individuals 
suspected of being unauthorized immigrants, SO40 prohibited officers 
from engaging with members of the community for the sole purpose of 
uncovering civil immigration violations.147 As compared to the Executive 
 
142 Id. at 583–84. 
143 California Appellate Court Rules Against San Francisco Sanctuary Policy, Judicial 
Watch (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/ 
california-appeals-court-rules-against-san-francisco-sanctuary-policy/. 
144 See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code §§ 12H, 12I. 
145 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2009). 
146 Id. at 722, 724–25. SO40 and other Special Orders are directives issued by the 
Police Chief which amend the LAPD Manual. SO40 is incorporated into the Manual 
at Volume IV, § 264.50. 
147 Rampart Indep. Review Panel, A Report to the Los Angeles Board of 
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Order at issue in New York v. United States, a “don’t tell” policy that pro-
hibited sharing immigration-related information with federal immigra-
tion authorities, SO40 has been characterized as a “don’t ask” policy.148 
Sturgeon sought an injunction against the enforcement of SO40 as 
an illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds.149 Sturgeon alleged that SO40 
violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it was in 
direct conflict with § 1373. He also argued that, even absent an unconsti-
tutional conflict with § 1373, SO40 was preempted by federal immigra-
tion law because it was an improper “regulation of immigration” and 
stood as an obstacle to Congress’s intentions in enacting § 1373.150 The 
court of appeal concluded that Sturgeon had brought a facial challenge 
to SO40 since he had not offered evidence of any specific applications of 
SO40 resulting in a violation of § 1373.151 After reviewing the text of SO40 
and § 1373, the court found that there was “no total and fatal conflict” 
between them.152 Specifically, the court found no conflict because SO40 
said nothing about communication with ICE, the only topic addressed by 
§ 1373, and § 1373 said nothing about initiation of police action or ar-
rests for illegal entry, the only topics addressed by SO40.153 The court sim-
ilarly found that SO40 did not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s purpos-
es and objective in enacting § 1373. While leaving open the possibility 
that SO40 could be interpreted or applied in a way that conflicted with 
§ 1373, the court found that SO40 was not preempted because by its 
terms it had “no effect on the voluntary flow of immigration information 
between LAPD officers and ICE.”154 
 
Police Commissioners Concerning Special Order 40, at 1 (Feb. 1, 2001), http:// 
assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/report_rampart_special_order_40.pdf. 
148 Hing, supra note 12, at 259–60. 
149 Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722. Harold Sturgeon has been the named 
plaintiff in at least two other lawsuits brought by Judicial Watch, Inc. See Sturgeon v. 
County of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Ct. App. 2010); Sturgeon v. County of 
Los Angeles, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 150 Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732. Plaintiff also alleged that SO40 was invalid 
because it violated § 834b of the California Penal Code, a provision that imposes 
certain requirements on all state law enforcement agencies relating to obtaining and 
reporting immigration-related information to federal immigration authorities. The 
court dismissed this claim based on a prior federal court ruling that § 834b was 
preempted as an impermissible regulation of immigration law. See id. at 733–34. 
151 Id. at 730. 
152 Id. at 731–32. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 732–33; see also Moreno v. Bratton, No. B214390, 2010 WL 161503, at *2 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting Judicial Watch challenge to LAPD sanctuary policy in 
the context of compliance with § 11369 of the California Health and Safety Code 
requiring reporting of persons arrested for certain drug-related crimes to 
immigration authorities); Steven M. Ellis, Court Rejects Challenge to LAPD Immigration 
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While the controversy over states, cities, and law enforcement agen-
cies adopting policies or practices that limit their involvement with fed-
eral immigration enforcement continues to rage almost twenty years after 
§§ 1644 and 1373 became law, the federal anti-sanctuary provisions have 
been largely ineffective in putting a stop to sanctuary laws and policies. In 
addition, the legal challenges to sanctuary laws based on §§ 1644 and 
1373 have not resulted in the expansive interpretations of the statutes 
that the plaintiffs and opponents of sanctuary laws in general were hop-
ing for. Indeed, as discussed above, the litigation has brought clarity on 
how very limited the application of the statutes is, providing guidance to 
states and cities as they moved forward with drafting their own sanctuary 
provisions. As weapons against sub-federal sanctuary measures, §§ 1644 
and 1373 have proven much less than lethal. 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY 
PROVISIONS AND OTHER FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 
Much of the debate and virtually all of the litigation surrounding 
§§ 1644 and 1373 has centered on how these provisions impact the ability 
of state and local law enforcement agencies and officers to implement 
practices that protect from disclosure the immigration status of individu-
als they come in contact with in the course of their professional duties. 
And there is little doubt that the 1996 laws were passed in substantial part 
to respond specifically to measures implemented by or directed at local 
law enforcement agencies that attempted to limit immigration infor-
mation sharing between state and local police and federal immigration 
officials. Nevertheless, government agencies and officials outside of law 
enforcement arguably come in even more frequent contact with unau-
thorized immigrant residents and have access to personal information 
about them. In particular, officials and employees of public schools and 
public health care systems have frequent interactions with and access to 
personal, identifying information about unauthorized immigrants resid-
ing in a community. And like law enforcement agencies, they would fall 
within the ambit of §§ 1644 and 1373, and so be prohibited from adopt-
ing policies or practices that restrict the sharing of immigration-related 
information with federal immigration authorities. If this is true, a regis-
trar at a local elementary school could not be prohibited from contacting 
ICE to provide the names and addresses of students and their families 
that she believed were in the United States in violation of immigration 
law. Similarly, a records clerk at a public hospital emergency room could 
call ICE to provide the names and addresses of emergency room patients, 
who because they spoke Spanish and had no medical insurance, he sus-
 
Policy, L.A. Cmty Policing (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.lacp.org/2010-Articles-Main/ 
012110-CourtRejectsChallengeToLAPDImmigrationPolicy.htm. 
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pected were unauthorized immigrants. The impact of such disclosures 
would be devastating to the individuals involved and have a chilling effect 
on the willingness of other unauthorized immigrants to send their chil-
dren to school or to seek medical treatment. Indeed, in at least one state 
that passed a state anti-sanctuary bill that mirrored § 1373, there was an 
immediate drop in attendance in public schools serving the immigrant 
communities in that state,155 and a child’s death was reported when his 
parents delayed seeking medical treatment because they feared that hos-
pital officials would report them to ICE.156 In addition, public health offi-
cials have expressed grave concerns that state immigration enforcement 
initiatives, including anti-sanctuary measures, will impede the manage-
ment of communicable disease treatment if unauthorized immigrants 
avoid diagnosis or treatment out of fear of reporting by health care pro-
viders to federal immigration officials.157 
Part of the message implicit in §§ 1644 and 1373, as well as in copy-
cat state measures, is that any public employee who acquires personal in-
formation about an unauthorized immigrant in the course of his or her 
official duties is free to contact ICE to report a suspected immigration vi-
olation and that no government agency or official may do anything to 
prevent that. The power in that message is real and gives license to those 
who might want to report and anxiety to those who fear being reported. 
Nor are concerns about personal information gathered by state agencies 
 
155 Campbell Robertson, After Ruling, Hispanics Flee an Alabama Town, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 3, 2011, at A1. Two days after a federal judge upheld Alabama’s H.B. 56, nearly 
2,000 Hispanic children across the state were absent from school. 
156 Justin Juozapavicius, Okla. Immigration Law Blamed for Death, Fox News 
(Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Jan25/0,4675, 
ImmigrationCrackdownOklahoma,00.html. Edgar Castorena, a two-month-old child, 
died of a ruptured intestine in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in July 2007. Though he had 
suffered for more than a week with diarrhea, his parents, both unauthorized 
immigrants, were afraid to take him to a hospital out of concern that a recently 
passed state law that permitted and encouraged public employees to share 
immigration status information with federal immigration officials would lead to their 
deportation. The Oklahoma law, H.B. 1804, included a provision that prohibited 
state and local government agencies and officials from restricting government 
employees from communicating or cooperating with federal immigration authorities. 
157 Am. Coll. of Physicians, State Immigration Initiatives Affecting Access 
to Health Care, https://www.acponline.org/advocacy/state_health_policy/ 
otherissuesofinterest/state_immigration_innitiatives.pdf (“[P]rospective patients may 
not seek needed medical care for fear of being reported to immigration authorities 
which could, in turn, endanger the public health.”); see also Sonal S. Munsiff, 
Communicable Disease and Immigration Fears, 9 Virtual Mentor: AMA J. Ethics 799, 
803 (2007) (“Patients who fear and avoid treatment could infect many more people; 
it is in all of society’s interest to ensure that all patients with TB are fully and 
confidentially treated.”). 
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being shared with immigration enforcement officials unfounded. In Salt 
Lake City, Utah, as lawmakers there began to draft a bill modeled after 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a group calling itself Concerned Citizens of the 
United States released a list entitled “Illegal Immigrants” that included 
personal information about 1300 people, including names, addresses, 
dates of birth, and other information.158 The list was sent to news media 
and law enforcement agencies accompanied by a letter urging the publi-
cation of the list and the immediate deportation of every person on the 
list.159 The release of the list caused panic in the immigrant community, 
especially because the list was not published anywhere so there was anxie-
ty about who was on the list and what action might be taken against 
them.160 One representative of a local advocacy organization called it a 
“witch hunt.”161 An investigation discovered that at least two employees 
from the State Workforce Services office were involved, and the Gover-
nor’s Office issued a statement acknowledging that the release of this in-
formation could be a violation of both state and federal law, including 
“federal medical privacy laws,” and could lead to criminal prosecutions.162 
Among the information collected by the Workforce Services Office is in-
formation in connection with applications for food stamps and Medicaid, 
including due date information about pregnant women seeking prenatal 
health services.163 State officials referred to the employees involved as 
rogue employees, disgruntled around some issues related to immigra-
tion,164 but this incident exemplifies the unfettered voluntary infor-
mation-sharing that the federal anti-sanctuary statutes are intended to 
both encourage and provoke. While in this case both the scope of the in-
formation released and the recipients of that information went beyond 
the disclosures protected under §§ 1644 and 1373, the anti-sanctuary 
provisions are clearly intended to prevent states and localities from put-
ting up any obstacles to immigration-related information sharing by pub-
lic employees, even when that information may otherwise be protected by 
federal law. Notably, although both employees in this case lost their jobs 
and were eventually convicted of state crimes, neither was charged with a 
 
158 Kirk Johnson, ‘Immigrant’ List in Utah Reveals Private Data and Sets Off Fears, N.Y. 
Times, July 15, 2010, at A1. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at A3. 
161 David Wright et al., Leaking of List of Illegal Immigrants in Utah Terrifies Latino 
Community, ABC News (July 15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/leaking-list-1300-
purported-illegal-immigrants-living-utah/story?id=11166203&singlePage=true. 
162 Johnson, supra note 158, at A3. 
163 Id. 
164 Brock Vergakis, Utah Illegal Immigrants List Leakers Identified, Huffington Post 
(May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/16/utah-illegal-immigrants-
l_n_649625.html. 
LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete) 5/24/2016  4:23 PM 
2016] FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW 201 
 
violation of a federal privacy law.165 However, assuming the information 
released was in fact protected by federal medical privacy laws, it is far 
from clear that §§ 1644 and 1373 would have protected these employees 
from prosecution under federal law, even for the limited release to fed-
eral immigration authorities specifically permitted by these provisions. 
Sections 1644 and 1373 both prohibit state or local government re-
strictions on the communication of immigration status information be-
tween federal and state or local entities “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of Federal, State, or local law.”166 In the context of educational 
and health records in particular, this calls into question whether and how 
other federal laws protecting the privacy of these records may operate to 
prevent disclosures of immigration status information that falls within the 
scope of protected health and educational records. Is a public official or 
employee with access to protected health, educational or other records 
prohibited from disclosing that information to federal immigration au-
thorities? Do the federal anti-sanctuary provisions supersede or repeal 
conflicting federal laws that would restrict sharing immigration status in-
formation with federal immigration authorities? 
A. Sections 1644 and 1373 Do Not Repeal Existing Privacy Protections in 
Federal Law 
When the federal anti-sanctuary provisions became law in 1996, 
there were federal laws in place that prohibited disclosure of information 
from tax records,167 educational records,168 health records,169 driver’s li-
cense records170 and census records.171 Despite the fact that §§ 1644 and 
1373 each contain the prefatory phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other 
 
165 Nate Carlisle, Probation for Former Utah Employees Who Made ‘the List,’ Salt Lake 
Trib. (June 7, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/51952737-78/carson-bassett-
reed-list.html.csp (“Carson pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and was given 12 months 
of probation and a $440 fine. Bassett . . . maintained her innocence but 
acknowledged prosecutors had enough evidence to convict her of two felonies. A 
judge sentenced Bassett to 36 months of probation and 250 hours of community 
service.”). 
166 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012); id. § 1373. 
167 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 1202, 90 Stat. 1520, 1667 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)). 
168 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513, 
88 Stat. 484, 571 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g). 
169 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 262, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6). 
170 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721(a)). 
171 Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 740, 68 Stat. 1012, 1013–14 (codified as 
amended at 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)). 
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provisions of Federal, state or local law,” a fair reading of the text and 
history of the statutes suggests that the anti-sanctuary provisions were not 
intended to and do not repeal conflicting privacy protections in federal 
law. 
First, the text of the statutes does not suggest that Congress intended 
to repeal any particular federal privacy protection or federal privacy pro-
tections in general. It is beyond doubt that Congress was aware in 1996 
that there existed a number of federal laws that placed restrictions on 
disclosure of certain categories of protected information. Federal protec-
tions for taxpayer information and educational records had been in place 
for decades, and a federal law prohibiting release of driver’s license in-
formation had been implemented just two years prior. Indeed, in the 
same session of Congress in which §§ 1644 and 1373 were enacted, Con-
gress considered and adopted the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA), which included prohibitions on disclosure of 
protected health information.172 Had Congress wanted to repeal these ex-
isting protections, §§ 1644 and 1373 could have been drafted in a man-
ner which would have left no ambiguity about their intent.173 “[I]t is ‘[a] 
long-standing maxim of statutory construction that statutes are enacted 
in accord with the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes, and 
therefore statutes dealing with the same subject should be construed to-
gether.’”174 In the absence of a clear expression of an intent to repeal, 
then, the anti-sanctuary provisions must be read in a way that will allow 
them to be reconciled with existing privacy protections.175 To do other-
wise is to assume that Congress intended to roll back long-standing priva-
cy protections, a conclusion that seems especially unlikely given the 
number of existing federal laws likely to be impacted and absent clear 
language to that effect in the statutes. 
 
172 HIPAA § 262 was enacted on August 21, 1996, one day before PRWORA. 
173 See Relationship Between Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 and Statutory Requirement for Confidentiality of Census 
Information, 23 Op. O.L.C. Supp., at 5 (1999) [hereinafter IIRIRA Opinion Letter], 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/10/
1999-05-18-census-confidentiality.pdf. 
174 Id. (quoting Memorandum for Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Att’y Gen. for 
Admin., from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: 
Establishing a Maximum Entry Age Limit for Law Enforcement Officer Positions in the 
Department of Justice, at 3 (Apr. 3, 1975)). 
175 Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (citing United States v. 
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)) (“The courts are not at liberty to pick and 
choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional 
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. ‘When there are two acts upon 
the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible . . . . The intention of the 
legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.’”). 
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In 1999, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
was asked to consider the relationship between § 1373 and a federal stat-
ute barring disclosure of census-related information.176 In that opinion, 
the OLC concluded that § 1373 did not act to repeal the census privacy 
law. Though the OLC opinion focused specifically on the interaction be-
tween § 1373 and the census-privacy protections, the analysis and conclu-
sions apply as well to the interaction of the federal anti-sanctuary statutes 
and other privacy protections in federal law. The OLC considered first 
whether the prohibition in § 1373 on federal, state, or local-government 
entities and officials was meant to include the “United States Congress 
acting pursuant to its lawmaking authority.”177 Such an interpretation, the 
OLC concluded, would “be at odds” with the principle that Congress 
“may not, by statute, direct the Congress not to enact certain laws in the 
future.”178 Since Congress lacks the authority “to command itself by stat-
ute not to enact a law in the future,” the OLC concluded that “it would 
be odd to construe the command contained in § 1373 to have been in-
tended to apply to Congress’s own power to enact prohibitions or re-
strictions on disclosure.”179 The only way to avoid that odd outcome 
would be to interpret § 1373 to apply only retroactively to federal stat-
utes. 
The OLC, however, concluded that there was no basis for construing 
§ 1373 to apply both prospectively and retroactively to state and local laws 
but only retroactively to federal statutes. The interpretive “oddities” 
could be avoided, according to OLC, if the text of § 1373 was interpreted 
instead to “apply only to disclosure prohibitions or restrictions other than 
those imposed by federal statute.”180 Interpreting § 1373 to invalidate 
conflicting state and local non-disclosure law is consistent with the re-
quirement that sub-federal governments can only legislate in the immi-
gration area in accord with federal law. Similarly, § 1373 could be “com-
fortably construed to limit the discretionary authority of federal officers, 
or employees, or . . . agencies”—but not Congress—to adopt prohibitions 
on disclosure, since such discretionary authority may generally only be 
exercised to the extent permitted by statute.181 
 
176 See IIRIRA Opinion Letter, supra note 173 (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) and 13 
U.S.C. § 9(a)). 
177 Id. at 6. 
178 Id. (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810)) (“The 
principle asserted is that one legislature . . . cannot abridge the powers of a 
succeeding legislature. The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general 
legislation, can never be controverted.”). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 6–7. 
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While the OLC acknowledged that the prefatory language “‘notwith-
standing any other provisions of Federal, State, or local law’ does reflect a 
congressional intent to displace inconsistent law,” it concluded that ab-
sent any other indication of Congress’s intent to repeal, this language did 
not “support a broad construction of the substantive provision that would 
give rise to such inconsistencies.”182 The fact that a statute provides that it 
is effective notwithstanding any other provision of law “does not evidence 
an express repeal” of the statute.183 This is especially true when the poten-
tial repealer does not identify in any way the statute or statutes that might 
be affected, but instead is a general repealing clause that has the poten-
tial to affect a number of inconsistent enactments.184 Under these circum-
stances, the OLC suggested that with respect to federal law, the “notwith-
standing” phrase of § 1373 can only be reasonably interpreted to mean 
that federal officials or entities may not “exercise their general adminis-
trative discretion in a manner that would prohibit or restrict disclosures” 
of immigration-related information covered by § 1373.185 “The phrase 
should not be understood to refer, therefore, to federal statutes that 
themselves prohibit or restrict such disclosures.”186 
The OLC also considered the “important governmental interests that 
first prompted the enactment of a statutory requirement of confidentiali-
ty” for census information. Confidentiality encourages the public to co-
operate with census officials by “giv[ing] effective assurance to all persons 
. . . that the identity of the informant and the information furnished 
would be held in complete confidence.”187 Together with the fact that the 
census privacy law had been amended subsequent to the adoption of 
§ 1373 to add two specific exceptions to the confidentiality requirement 
and had not specifically mentioned the interplay with § 1373,188 the OLC 
concluded that “[i]t is unlikely that . . . Congress would have adopted 
such a significant limitation on the scope of the census confidentiality 
requirement without either referring to it expressly” in § 1373 or an 
 
182 Id. at 6. 
183 Moyle v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 147 F.3d 1116, 1119 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1998) (citing In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 582 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
184 See Moyle, 147 F.3d at 1119 n.4 (quoting 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction § 23.08 (5th ed. 1993) (“An express general repealing 
clause to the effect that all inconsistent enactments are repealed, should legally be a 
nullity.”)). 
185 IIRIRA Opinion Letter, supra note 173, at 7. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 10 (quoting Seventeenth Decennial Census, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 120, 124 
(1953)) (citing Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 356–62 (1982) (concluding that in 
enacting the Freedom of Information Act, and in giving courts authority to discover 
non-privileged information, Congress could not have intended to override the census 
privacy protections)). 
188 Id. at 8. 
LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete) 5/24/2016  4:23 PM 
2016] FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW 205 
 
amendment to the census privacy provision, or “at the least, using more 
direct language than it has employed here.”189 
Finally, the OLC looked to the legislative history for any indication 
that Congress intended to repeal federal statutory restrictions on disclo-
sure of confidential information. Here, too, the OLC concluded that the 
legislative history reveals no such intent, pointing out that the House 
conference report refers only to the impact of § 1373 on state or local en-
tities190 and that the Senate report suggests that Congress was primarily 
concerned with state and local restrictions, not federal statutory re-
strictions.191 Since the OLC opinion was limited to a discussion of § 1373, 
it did not consider the reference to FERPA in the House Conference Re-
port to § 1644, but that reference similarly contains no clear expression 
of a congressional intent to repeal the privacy protections in FERPA or 
any other federal privacy provisions: 
The confidentiality provisions of various State statutes may prohibit 
disclosure of immigration status obtained under them. Some Fed-
eral laws, including the Family Education Rights and Protection 
Act, may deny funds to certain State and local agencies that disclose 
a protected individual’s immigration status. Various localities have 
enacted laws preventing local officials from disclosing the immigra-
tion status of individuals to INS.192 
At most, this language suggests that Congress may have been aware 
of certain state and local laws prohibiting disclosure of immigration-
related information and that some Federal laws, including FERPA, may 
deny funds to states that make unauthorized disclosures of immigration-
related information. Nothing here suggests that Congress intended to 
supersede the disclosure protections in FERPA. In fact, this language 
might more appropriately be read as an expression of Congress’s intent 
to invalidate the state and local measures, but leave intact the privacy 
 
189 Id. at 11. 
190 See id. at 11–12 (“[Section 1373] provides that notwithstanding any other 
provision of Federal, State or local law, no State or local government entity shall prohibit 
or in any way restrict any government entity or official from sending to or receiving 
from the INS information regarding the immigration status of any individual in the 
United States.” (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 249 (1996) 
(Conf. Rep.))). 
191 See id. at 11 (“Effective immigration law enforcement requires a cooperative 
effort between all levels of government. The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange 
of immigration-related information by State and local agencies is consistent with, and 
potentially of considerable assistance to, the Federal regulation of immigration and 
the achieving of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996))). 
192 H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 391 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
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protections provided under FERPA and the other federal laws refer-
enced. 
The OLC’s analysis and conclusions with respect to § 1373 and the 
federal census privacy protections suggest that the federal anti-sanctuary 
provisions do not and were not intended to repeal any other existing pri-
vacy protections in federal law. Neither the text nor the legislative history 
of §§ 1644 or 1373 reveals an intent by Congress to repeal existing feder-
al privacy laws. Additionally, given the important governmental interest 
in protecting confidential educational, health, driver’s license, and tax 
information,193 and the impact that a repeal of these provisions would 
have on those interests, it is inconceivable that Congress could have in-
tended such a result. Indeed, as discussed below, the federal government 
has made it quite clear that FERPA’s privacy protections apply with equal 
force to immigration-related information in education records, and that 
failing to comply with such protections is both illegal and unconstitu-
tional. 
B. FERPA and Disclosure of Educational Records to Immigration Authorities 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) 
generally prohibits school officials and employees from disclosing educa-
tion records without the prior written consent of the parent.194 FERPA de-
fines education records to include “records, files, documents, and other 
materials which—(i) contain information directly related to a student; 
and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a 
person acting for such agency or institution.”195 Certain information is 
specifically excluded from the definition of educational records, includ-
ing “records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational 
agency . . . that were created by that law enforcement unit for the pur-
pose of law enforcement.”196 Additionally, there are exceptions under 
 
193 See, e.g., Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and 
Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133, 148–49 (2004) (stating that 
due to “increased electronic transmission of health information” under HIPAA, 
Congress “recogniz[ed] the concomitant need to guarantee certain protections to 
patients’ privacy”); Dixie Snow Huefner & Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA Update: Balancing 
Access to and Privacy of Student Records, 152 Ed. L. Rep. 469, 469 (2001) (noting that 
FERPA was enacted at a time when “[p]rivacy was a growing concern”); Stephen W. 
Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1065, 1070–71 (2003) 
(citing government studies that linked confidentially to an increase in taxpayer 
cooperation). 
194 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a) (2015). FERPA applies to all 
schools, public and private, that receive funds under an applicable program of the 
U.S. Department of Education. Id. 
195 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A). 
196 Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii). The definition of law enforcement records limits the 
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which disclosure of otherwise protected educational records may be 
made without prior parental consent,197 but reporting immigration status 
or any other information to a federal immigration agency or even to local 
law enforcement is not among the exceptions. Moreover, re-disclosure of 
information by the individual or agency receiving information from a 
school under one of these exceptions is also strictly proscribed.198 Schools 
may also disclose, without consent, “directory” information including a 
student’s name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth, 
honors and awards, and dates of attendance.199 However, schools must 
tell parents and eligible students about directory information and allow 
parents and eligible students a reasonable amount of time to request that 
the school not disclose directory information about them.200 Generally, 
directory information is information that would not be considered harm-
ful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed.201 In the context of immigration 
enforcement, place of birth could very well be among the “directory” in-
formation that an immigrant family would not want disclosed, since a 
birthplace outside of the United States could raise questions about citi-
zenship or immigration status. However, even the disclosure of such “di-
rectory” information requires advance notification to parents and an op-
portunity to object to release of that information.202 
The collection and dissemination of student personal information 
and education records has been a source of debate and confusion among 
educators, parents, and lawmakers since the 1982 Supreme Court ruling 
 
scope of information that falls into this exception: “Education records, and personally 
identifiable information contained in education records, do not lose their status as 
education records and remain subject to the Act, including the disclosure provisions 
of § 99.30, while in the possession of the law enforcement unit.” 34 C.F.R. 
§ 99.8(c)(2). 
197 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31; Family Policy Compliance Office, Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. Dep’t of Educ., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/ 
gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html (listing exceptions allowing disclosure of records 
“to the following parties or under the following conditions . . . : School officials with 
legitimate educational interest; [o]ther schools to which a student is transferring; 
[s]pecified officials for audit or evaluation purposes; [a]ppropriate parties in 
connection with financial aid to a student; [o]rganizations conducting certain studies 
for or on behalf of the school; [a]ccrediting organizations; [t]o comply with a judicial 
order or lawfully issued subpoena; [a]ppropriate officials in cases of health and safety 
emergencies; and [s]tate and local authorities, within a juvenile justice system, 
pursuant to specific State law”). 
198 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 99.33. 
199 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.37. 
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in Plyler v. Doe.203 Plyler overturned a 1975 Texas statute that authorized 
Texas school districts to deny enrollment to unauthorized immigrant 
children and withheld state funding for their education. In declaring the 
Texas law unconstitutional, Plyler held that unauthorized-immigrant chil-
dren must have the same access to public primary and secondary educa-
tion as U.S.-citizen children and cannot be denied access to enrollment 
based solely on their immigration status.204 Denying unauthorized immi-
grant children access to public education, the Court held, was a violation 
of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution.205 
In the more than two decades since the Plyler decision, numerous at-
tempts have been made to overturn or circumvent Plyler.206 Notable for 
the purposes of this article have been efforts by school districts and some 
state legislatures to require certain forms of identification or proof of res-
idence for all children enrolling in public school. Typically, the docu-
mentation or information required has included documents or infor-
mation that an unauthorized immigrant child would be unable to 
provide, including social security numbers, driver’s licenses, green cards, 
or visas.207 Students unable to produce the documents are unable to en-
roll and others, aware of the documentation requirement are discour-
aged from attempting to enroll, and both are ultimately denied access to 
free public education in violation of Plyler.208 In response to reports that 
 
203 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
204 Id. at 230. 
205 Id. at 210–213. 
206 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (overturning Proposition 187, a referendum that would have 
banned enrollment in California public schools by unauthorized immigrant children 
and required authorities to report the children’s unauthorized—or apparently 
unauthorized—parents or guardians). In another unsuccessful attempt to reverse 
Plyler, California representative Elton Gallegly proposed an amendment to an 
immigration bill that would permit the states to deny unauthorized alien children 
free K-12 public education, as California had sought to do with Proposition 187, or to 
charge those students tuition for public school enrollment, as Texas had done 
before. See H.R. 4134, 104th Cong. (1996); Marc Lacey et al., Gallegly Brings Proposition 
187-Style Tug-of-War to Congress, L.A. Times (Apr. 12, 1996), http://articles. 
latimes.com/1996-04-12/local/me-57668_1_elton-gallegly. The Gallegly amendment 
failed. 
207 See Udi Ofer, Protecting Plyler: New Challenges to the Right of Immigrant Children to 
Access a Public School Education, 1 Colum. J. Race & L. 187, 204–09 (2012). 
208 Id.; see Julia Preston, Districts Told Not to Deny Students Over Immigration, N.Y. 
Times (May 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/us/districts-are-warned-
not-to-deny-students-over-immigration-status.html. The Department of Justice entered 
into formal settlements with two counties in Georgia and Florida, which at the time 
were engaging in practices that prevented undocumented students from enrolling. 
See Agreement Between the United States of America and Henry County 
School District (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
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many school districts engaged in practices that discouraged enrollment 
by unauthorized immigrant children, the U.S. Departments of Justice 
and Education recently issued an amended guidance detailing the types 
of documentation that can legally be required for enrollment in public 
schools.209 That guidance reminded state and local education agencies of 
their obligation under federal law to provide all children with equal ac-
cess to primary and secondary education and “encourage[d] states and 
districts to proactively implement supportive enrollment policies and 
practices that create a welcoming and inclusive environment for all stu-
dents.”210 Further, it specifically advised that schools may not inquire 
about a student’s or parent’s citizenship or immigration status as proof of 
residency; refuse to enroll a student who does not provide a social securi-
ty number or request a social security number from a parent; or prevent 
or discourage a child from enrolling because he does not have a birth 
certificate or has a foreign birth certificate.211 Significantly, it also noted 
that FERPA controls the circumstances under which a school district, 
once it has acquired personal information about a student, may disclose 
information from that student’s education records without the consent of 
a parent.212 The guidance confirmed that these circumstances are “lim-
ited and unlikely to be applicable in the majority of situations school dis-
tricts confront.”213 There is no mention in the guidance of federal anti-
sanctuary provisions providing a mechanism for disclosure of immigra-
tion-status information from educational records contrary to FERPA’s 
protections. Rather, as noted above, the guidance makes clear that school 
districts are not to concern themselves with the immigration status of 
 
456201211914625474963.pdf. Additionally, following a lawsuit brought by the ACLU, 
a New Jersey school district stopped a practice that required parents to present state-
issued identification cards that undocumented immigrants could not obtain. Id. A 
survey showed that at least 187 New Jersey school districts were illegally requesting 
Social Security numbers during enrollment. See 1 in 5 NJ Schools Puts Up Barriers for 
Immigrant Children, ACLU N.J. (Sept. 2, 2008), https://www.aclu-nj.org/news/2008/ 
09/02/1-in-5-nj-schools-puts-up-barriers-for-immigrant-children/. 
209 See Preston, supra note 208; see Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon et al., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May. 8, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201405.pdf; Fact Sheet: Information on the Rights 
of All Children to Enroll in School, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/plylerfact.pdf; Information on the 
Rights of All Children to Enroll in School: Questions and Answers for States, School 
Districts and Parents, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/plylerqa.pdf [hereinafter Questions 
and Answers]. 
210 Questions and Answers, supra note 209, at 1. 
211 Id. at 3–5. 
212 Id. at 5. 
213 Id. 
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their students and should take steps to ensure that they do not act in a 
way that would discourage or prevent any child from enrolling in school. 
In addition to unlawful documentation requirements, there have al-
so been state measures that require public schools to collect information 
about the immigration status of students and their parents in a purported 
attempt to track the number of unauthorized immigrant children en-
rolled.214 These measures not only mandate collection of information 
about immigration status, they also require the state Department of Edu-
cation to report to the legislature the costs associated with educating un-
authorized immigrant children, presumably with a goal of proving that 
providing this education substantially impacts the state education budget 
and, as a result, the quality of education in the state overall. In Plyler, the 
Supreme Court rejected Texas’s claim that the cost of educating unau-
thorized immigrant children detracted from the overall quality of educa-
tion available to students in the state, finding that “[t]he record in no 
way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is likely 
to improve the overall quality of education in the State.”215 These more 
recent data-gathering provisions are likely intended by the states to arm 
themselves with evidence found lacking in Plyler and, ultimately, to pave 
the way for an end to Plyler.216 But whether or not that happens, these 
state measures, which require school districts to gather immigration sta-
tus information from all enrolling students, prompt a more careful look 
at the interplay between the federal anti-sanctuary statutes and FERPA. 
The Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act 
(H.B. 56) provides an opportunity to do just that. H.B. 56 was enacted in 
June 2011. It is, like Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a comprehensive bill with provi-
sions requiring immigration status checks at police stops, criminalizing 
failure to carry immigration documents, prohibiting employment by un-
authorized migrants, and requiring schools to verify the immigration sta-
 
214 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (LexisNexis 2011), invalidated by Hispanic Interest 
Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Ofer, supra 
note 207, at 218–22. 
215 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982). 
216 See id. (“As the District Court . . . noted, the State failed to offer any ‘credible 
supporting evidence that a proportionately small diminution of the funds spent on 
each child [which might result from devoting some state funds to the education of 
the excluded group] will have a grave impact on the quality of education.’ And, after 
reviewing the State’s school financing mechanism, the District Court . . . concluded 
that barring undocumented children from local schools would not necessarily 
improve the quality of education provided in those schools. Of course, even if 
improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number 
of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this 
group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need, 
however, undocumented children are ‘basically indistinguishable’ from legally 
resident alien children.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
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tus of all students enrolling.217 The law was immediately challenged by the 
U.S. Department of Justice and a coalition of human rights groups.218 By 
August 2012, many of the law’s provisions had been blocked by federal 
courts, including § 28, the provision requiring immigration status checks 
and information gathering for public-school students.219 Section 28 re-
quires public elementary and secondary schools in the state to determine 
if the child “was born outside the . . . United States” or is the child of an 
unauthorized immigrant parent.220 This determination is made by exam-
ining the child’s birth certificate.221 If the birth certificate reveals “that 
the student was born outside the . . . United States or is the child of an 
alien not lawfully present in the United States,” or if no birth certificate is 
available, then the child’s guardian must notify the school of the child’s 
actual citizenship or immigration status within 30 days.222 The statute 
specifies that this notification shall be either official documentation of 
the student’s U.S. citizenship or legal immigration status or a sworn dec-
laration of the parent confirming the U.S. citizenship or legal immigra-
tion status of the child.223 If no such notification is provided the school 
 
217 See Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. 
Laws 888 (codified as amended at Ala. Code § 31-13-1 to -13-35); see also S.B. 1070, 
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
218 See Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236, 1240 
(11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2012). 
219 See Hispanic Interest Coal., 691 F.3d at 1241. 
220 Ala. Code § 31-13-27(a)(1) (“Every public elementary and secondary school 
in this state, at the time of enrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school, 
shall determine whether the student enrolling in public school was born outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the 
United States and qualifies for assignment to an English as Second Language class or 
other remedial program.”). 
221 Id. § 31-13-27(a)(2) (“The public school, when making the determination 
required by subdivision (1), shall rely upon presentation of the student’s original 
birth certificate, or a certified copy thereof.”). 
222 Id. § 31-13-27(a)(3) (“If, upon review of the student’s birth certificate, it is 
determined that the student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or 
is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States, or where such 
certificate is not available for any reason, the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of 
the student shall notify the school within 30 days of the date of the student’s 
enrollment of the actual citizenship or immigration status of the student under 
federal law.”). 
223 Id. § 31-13-27(a)(4) (“Notification shall consist of both of the following: a. 
The presentation for inspection to a school official . . . of official documentation 
establishing the citizenship and, in the case of an alien, the immigration status of the 
student, or alternatively by submission of a notarized copy of such documentation to 
such official[; and] b. Attestation by the parent, guardian, or legal custodian, under 
penalty of perjury, that the document states the true identity of the child. If the 
student or his or her parent, guardian, or legal representative possesses no such 
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shall presume and report that the student is not lawfully present in the 
United States.224 The statute further states that “[p]ublic disclosure by any 
person of information obtained pursuant to this section which personally 
identifies any student shall be unlawful, except for purposes permitted 
pursuant to 8 [U.S.C. §§] 1644 and 1373.”225 In other words, no student 
information gathered as a part of this enrollment process shall be dis-
closed except for immigration status information, which can be shared 
with federal immigration enforcement pursuant to federal anti-sanctuary 
provisions. 
In Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Alabama, and in United States v. Ala-
bama, the companion case filed by the United States against Alabama, the 
Eleventh Circuit approved an equal protection challenge to § 28.226 De-
spite the fact that the provision treats every child enrolling in Alabama 
schools the same by requiring the presentation of a birth certificate, the 
court found that the statute had a special impact on unauthorized immi-
grant children because it required them to disclose their immigration 
status as a condition of enrollment. Indeed, the court found that even 
though all students were required to show birth certificates, the purpose 
of the provision was to “force[] unlawfully present aliens to divulge their 
unlawful status,” either by “admit[ting their] unlawful status outright or 
conced[ing] it through silence.”227 As a result, the court found that the 
children were exposed to criminal prosecution, deportation, harassment 
and intimidation.228 “We are of the mind that an increased likelihood of 
deportation or harassment upon enrollment in school significantly deters 
undocumented children from enrolling in and attending school, in con-
travention of their rights under Plyler.”229 
Significantly, the court found that the adverse immigration conse-
quences inflicted on unauthorized-immigrant students by § 28 of H.B. 56 
were the direct result of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373. The court dismissed 
as ineffectual the language in § 28 limiting disclosure of student infor-
 
documentation but nevertheless maintains that the student is either a United States 
citizen or an alien lawfully present in the United States, the parent, guardian, or legal 
representative of the student may sign a declaration so stating, under penalty of 
perjury.”). 
224 Id. § 31-13-27(a)(5) (“If no such documentation or declaration is presented, 
the school official shall presume for the purposes of reporting under this section that 
the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.”) 
225 Id. § 31-13-27(e). The statute does, however, require that anyone intending to 
disclose this information “shall first apply to the Attorney General and receive a 
waiver of confidentiality from the requirements of this subsection.” Id. 
226 See Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236, 1249–50 (11th 
Cir. 2012). 
227 Id. at 1246–47. 
228 Id. at 1247. 
229 Id. 
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mation to those permitted under §§ 1644 and 1373, and found that the 
federal anti-sanctuary provisions in fact “require[d] Alabama to provide 
immigration-related information to the federal government and other 
states upon request and prohibit[ed] Alabama from restricting this trans-
fer of information.”230 Concluding that the risks resulting from the man-
datory disclosure of immigration status burdened the rights secured by 
Plyler, the court found that § 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause.231 
Neither party argued, nor did the court discuss, whether FERPA might 
protect from disclosure the personal student information gathered by 
schools pursuant to § 28. If it had, it is worth considering whether that 
would have altered the court’s assessment of § 28. 
First, whether or not the immigration-status information was pro-
tected from disclosure by FERPA, § 28 still arguably stands as an obstacle 
to the free public education guaranteed by Plyler. One has to assume that 
unauthorized immigrant children and their families in Alabama, even if 
not specifically aware that §§ 1644 and 1373 permitted the sharing of 
immigration status information between state, local and federal law en-
forcement agencies, could nonetheless be discouraged from enrolling in 
public schools if in order to do so they had to reveal their immigration 
status. This would be especially true given the media coverage of the en-
actment of H.B. 56232 and the law’s stated purpose to “discourage illegal 
immigration by requiring all agencies within this state to fully cooperate 
with federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal im-
migration laws.”233 
Alternatively, if the Eleventh Circuit had considered whether the 
student information gathered pursuant to § 28 was prohibited from dis-
closure by FERPA, it likely would have found that the information was in 
fact protected. Information about a student’s place of birth and immigra-
tion status gathered in the course of enrollment and maintained by the 
district would fall under FERPA’s definition of educational records. As 
such, unless the information fell within one of the narrow exceptions de-
fined in the FERPA statute, Alabama school officials could not disclose it 
to federal immigration authorities without express parental consent.234 
 
230 Id. at 1248. (“Any textual prohibition on revealing the immigration status of 
the children and their families is of little comfort when federal law requires that 
disclosure upon request.”). 
231 Id. at 1249–50. 
232 See Richard Fausset, Alabama Enacts Anti-Illegal Immigration Law Described as 
Nation’s Strictest, L.A. Times (June 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/ 
10/nation/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110610; Julia Preston, In Alabama, a Harsh 
Bill for Residents Here Illegally, N.Y. Times (June 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/06/04/us/04immig.html. 
233 Ala. Code § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis 2011). 
234 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.8, 99.31 (2015). 
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But even if the court had found that the immigration status information 
collected by Alabama schools was protected by FERPA, it still seems likely 
that it would have held that § 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
The court noted the overall purpose of § 28 is to “target[] the population 
of undocumented school children in Alabama,” and found that the 
mandated disclosure of immigration status could lead not only to immi-
gration enforcement and removal proceedings, but also to harassment 
and intimidation that would deter unauthorized immigrant children 
from enrolling in and attending school.235 The requirement to provide 
immigration-status information, even without the possibility of disclosure 
to federal immigration authorities, would lead to unacceptable burdens 
on immigrant children and their families.236 Thus, even with the protec-
tions provided by FERPA, the demand for immigration-status infor-
mation and documentation would likely still be found to unlawfully bur-
den a child’s rights under Plyler. 
The importance of acknowledging the privacy protections afforded 
by FERPA is nonetheless significant since it serves as an important coun-
terweight to the myth surrounding anti-sanctuary provisions that there 
can be no restrictions on a school district’s ability to share immigration 
status information with federal immigration authorities. As mentioned 
above, this is an important message not just for immigrant children and 
families seeking to enroll in public schools but also for school officials 
and employees who may misunderstand their obligations under FERPA 
in light of the anti-sanctuary provisions. The recent federal guidance on 
this issue237 is an important first step but greater efforts should be made 
by school districts to assure their students and their employees that, not-
withstanding 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373 or state copycat anti-sanctuary 
provisions, FERPA prohibits the disclosure of immigration-status infor-
mation except in the narrowest of circumstances. Only then can the 
promise of Plyler be fully achieved. 
 
235 Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236, 1246–47 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
236 Id. (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(prohibiting questions pertaining to immigration status during discovery in order not 
to “discourage legal and illegal immigrants alike from pursuing their potentially valid 
legal claims not only in this case, but in future cases as well”) and Zeng Liu v. Donna 
Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (finding that despite 
employer’s promises not to disclose immigration status of plaintiffs sought through 
discovery there would still remain ‘‘the danger of intimidation, the danger of 
destroying the cause of action’’)). 
237 See supra note 209. 
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V. THE FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY PROVISIONS IN THE BATTLE 
FOR AND AGAINST SUB-FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
A. The Path from Anti-Sanctuary to Pro-Enforcement 
If Congress’s repeated failure to achieve fair and workable immigra-
tion reform has led certain states and localities to refuse to cooperate in 
immigration enforcement, frustration with the federal government’s en-
forcement efforts has led others to take matters into their own hands and 
to seek out ways to maximize their own contribution to these enforce-
ment efforts. States and cities interested in taking on an active role in 
immigration enforcement have become involved in a number of differ-
ent ways, including entering into § 287(g) agreements to deputize local 
officers to assist ICE enforcement238 and enacting legislation to discour-
age unauthorized immigrants from coming to or remaining in their ju-
risdictions.239 A number of states have also enacted legislation to override 
and prevent the enactment of sanctuary laws and policies. That is, they 
adopted measures like §§ 1644 and 1373 that prohibited restrictions on 
communication of immigration-related information to ICE.240 Some of 
 
238 Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was adopted as part of 
IIRIRA in 1996. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)) “[§ 1357(g)] authorizes the Director of ICE to enter into 
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, permitting designated 
officers to perform immigration law enforcement functions, provided that the local 
law enforcement officers receive appropriate training and function under the 
supervision of ICE officers.” Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) 
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, 
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g. As of October 2012, fifty-seven 287(g) 
agreements were in place. See The 287(g) Program: A Flawed and Obsolete Method of 
Immigration Enforcement, Am. Immigr. Council (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www. 
immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/287g-program-flawed-and-obsolete-method-
immigration-enforcement. 
239 This legislation included provisions restricting access to public benefits, 
driver’s licenses, housing, educational programs, and health care, as well as provisions 
creating state crimes for unlawful presence in the state and for transporting and 
harboring unauthorized immigrants. See, e.g., Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer 
and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 888; Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen 
Protection Act, 2007 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 546–552; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 
(Sept. 2006); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2892 (2006). A number of these 
state and local laws have been struck down following legal challenges. See, e.g., Lozano 
v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010); Editorial, Alabama Surrenders, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/opinion/alabama-
surrenders.html. 
240 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (LexisNexis 2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-
1051(F) (2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-23(b) (2012); Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-18.2-3 
(LexisNexis 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-1 (West 2014); S.C. Code Ann. § 6-1-170 
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these state anti-sanctuary provisions closely mirror and even specifically 
reference §§ 1644 and 1373.241 Others provide some sort of penalty or 
other enforcement mechanism not present in the federal anti-sanctuary 
statutes.242 And some prohibit restrictions on a broader range of activities 
than §§ 1644 and 1373, going beyond communicating, sending, receiving 
and maintaining immigration-related information to prohibit policies 
that limit cooperation with federal immigration officials.243 
State-level anti-sanctuary provisions have been put in place to invali-
date existing measures and to ward off the implementation of future 
sanctuary efforts. In California and Arizona, where there were long-
standing sanctuary policies and practices in cities and towns within those 
states, anti-sanctuary provisions have been introduced as part of broadly 
sweeping legislation designed to bar unauthorized immigrant access to a 
variety of services and benefits, including employment, health care, pub-
lic benefits, and education, and to maximize state involvement in immi-
gration enforcement. In California, Proposition 187 became law at a time 
when there were sanctuary provisions in place in San Francisco, San Jose, 
Oakland and Sacramento.244 In Arizona, the anti-sanctuary provisions in 
S.B. 1070 were adopted after the cities of Tucson and Phoenix had im-
plemented sanctuary policies.245 In this respect, certain anti-sanctuary pol-
icies were indicative not only of the states’ frustration with federal immi-
gration efforts but also with perceived obstacles to enforcement within 
their own jurisdictions. As was true following the enactment of §§ 1644 
and 1373, communities impacted by these sub-federal anti-sanctuary pro-
visions reacted with concern about the chilling effect that these laws 
would have on immigrant access to health care, education and other ser-
vices, as well as the detrimental effect such policies would have on public 
 
(2014); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-68-103 (2011); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1006 
(LexisNexis 2012). 
241 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (LexisNexis 2011) (specifically referencing 
§§ 1344 and 1373); see also Mo. Ann. Stat. § 650.475(1), (3) (West 2014); Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 74, § 20j(D)–(E) (West 2015); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1006 (LexisNexis 
2012). 
242 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-23(c)–(d) (2012); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307(2) 
(West 2014); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j(F) (West 2015); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 5-2-
18.2-5 to -6; S.C. Code Ann. § 6-1-170(E)(3) (LexisNexis 2013). 
243 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-18.2-7 (LexisNexis 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-
11-1; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.63(B) (West Supp. 2014); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-
170(C) (LexisNexis 2013). 
244 See Carro, supra note 23, at 297 & n.2. 
245 See Christian Palmer, Local Control at Issue in Battle over Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws in Phoenix, Ariz. Capitol Times (Apr. 24, 2009), http:// 
azcapitoltimes.com/news/2009/04/24/local-control-at-issue-in-battle-over-enforcement-of-
immigration-laws/, 2009 WLNR 29878738 (quoting Arizona Senator Russell Pearce, 
who stated that “Phoenix, Mesa, Chandler and Tucson, to name a few, all adequately 
represent the ‘complete sanctuary city.’”). 
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safety and health in general.246 These concerns led to legal challenges 
where, once again, §§ 1644 and 1373 took center stage. 
In 1994, two years before the federal anti-sanctuary provisions be-
came law, California voters approved Proposition 187, a ballot initiative 
that not only denied unauthorized immigrants access to public services 
but also required public employees, including school teachers, health 
care workers, and police officers to verify and report the immigration sta-
tus of anyone with which they came into contact.247 Notably for this dis-
cussion, Proposition 187 also contained an anti-sanctuary provision, 
which specifically prohibited any local government or law enforcement 
agency from limiting or restricting the ability of its officials to cooperate 
with federal authorities on immigration.248 With its combination of provi-
sions mandating cooperation and immigration-status reporting by public 
employees and banning any restriction on such cooperation, Proposition 
187 sent the clear message that unauthorized immigrants were unwel-
come in the state and that, essentially, they had no place to hide from 
immigration enforcement.249 
The day after the law went into effect, a number of legal challenges 
were filed in state and federal court.250 Ultimately, the majority of the 
challenged provisions of Proposition 187, including the anti-sanctuary 
 
246 See Emily Bazar, Immigrant Activism Taking a Bold Turn, USA Today (Sept. 13, 
2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-12-immigrants_N.htm; Darryl 
Fears, Illegal Immigrants Targeted by States, Wash. Post (June 25, 2007), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/24/AR2007062401662.html. 
247 See Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the 
National Imagination, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 555, 555–56, 563 (1996). 
248 In a section entitled “Law Enforcement Cooperation with INS,” Proposition 
187 provided: “Any legislative, administrative, or other action by a city, county, or 
other legally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries, or 
by a law enforcement agency, to prevent or limit the cooperation required by 
subdivision (a) is expressly prohibited.” Cal. Penal Code § 834b(c) (West 2008) 
(repealed 2014). 
249 Proponents of Proposition 187, also known as the Save Our State Initiative 
(SOS), apparently envisioned that it would enable and encourage California residents 
to participate in “rounding up” unauthorized immigrants in the state. See Patrick J. 
McDonnell, Prop. 187 Turns Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate, L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 
1994, at A1 (quoting Proposition 187 initiative co-founder saying to a crowd of 
supporters, “you are the posse . . . SOS is the rope”); see also Prop. 187 § 1 (Cal. 1994) 
(“[T]he People of California declare their intention to provide for cooperation 
between their agencies of state and local government with the federal government, 
and to establish a system of required notification by and between such agencies to 
prevent illegal aliens in the United States from receiving benefits or public services in 
the State of California.”). 
250 Five actions filed in federal court were consolidated in League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Wilson (LULAC I), 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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provision, were found preempted by federal immigration law.251 With re-
spect to § 4, which included the provisions mandating immigration in-
quiries and reporting, as well as the anti-sanctuary provision, the federal 
district court, relying on De Canas v. Bica, found that these provisions 
constituted an impermissible regulation of immigration and were 
preempted.252 Distinguishing the Proposition 187 provisions from those 
at issue in De Canas, the court found that they had much more than a 
“purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration” and directly 
regulated immigration by “creating a comprehensive scheme to detect 
and report the presence and effect the removal of illegal aliens.”253 Addi-
tionally, the court found that, unlike the statute upheld in De Canas 
which adopted federal standards to determine a person’s immigration 
status, Proposition 187 created an entirely independent set of criteria of 
immigration classifications and required state agents to make “independ-
ent determinations of who is subject to the initiative’s benefits denial, no-
tification and cooperation/reporting provisions and who may lawfully 
remain in the United States.”254 As a result, these provisions were an un-
constitutional regulation of immigration and were preempted under De 
Canas’s first test.255 
At the time of the district court’s ruling in League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Wilson, §§ 1644 and 1373 had not yet been enacted. 
However, following the enactment of the anti-sanctuary provisions, the 
State of California filed a motion for reconsideration and ultimately an 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the district court’s preemption 
finding with respect to Proposition 187’s cooperation and reporting re-
quirements, including the anti-sanctuary provision, and arguing that the 
federal anti-sanctuary provisions “confirm that state and local govern-
ment cooperation with the INS is not preempted as a regulation of im-
migration.”256 The district court denied the motion for reconsideration257 
 
251 Id. at 786–87. 
252 Id. at 771 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). 
253 Id. at 769. 
254 Id. at 769–70. 
255 Id. at 771 (“[A] state may not require its agents to (i) make independent 
determinations of who is and who is not in this country ‘in violation of immigration 
laws;’ (ii) report such determinations to state and federal authorities; or (iii) 
‘cooperate’ with the INS, solely for the purpose of ensuring that such persons leave 
the country. The sole stated purpose and the sole effect of section 4 is to 
impermissibly regulate immigration. Accordingly, section 4 is entirely preempted by 
federal law under the first De Canas test.” (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354–56)). 
256 Opening Brief of Appellants at 44, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Wilson, No. 98-55671 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants], 1998 
WL 34178728. 
257 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 & 
n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Defendants argued that the [Welfare Reform Act] permits 
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and the appeal in the Ninth Circuit was ultimately withdrawn when the 
parties reached a settlement that nullified the majority of Proposition 
187, including the mandatory reporting and cooperation provisions and 
the anti-sanctuary provision.258 Nevertheless, the reliance by both parties 
on the federal anti-sanctuary provisions in the appeal reflect the increas-
ingly divergent understanding of §§ 1644 and 1373 as, on one side, a 
broad invitation for state and local involvement in immigration enforce-
ment, and on the other, a limited authorization for immigration-related 
information sharing. 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, California contended that Con-
gress’s unequivocal support for state and local cooperation in immigra-
tion enforcement, and its determination that such cooperation did not 
constitute an “unwanted interference” with federal regulation of immi-
gration, was reflected not only in §§ 1644 and 1373, but also in a separate 
provision of the Welfare Reform Act that specifically required state agen-
cies administering certain federal assistance programs to provide immi-
gration-related information quarterly to federal immigration authori-
ties:259 
It is difficult to conceive of a plainer statement of congressional pol-
icy and intent that state and local government entities be permitted 
to cooperate with the INS. [The Welfare Reform Act] and [IIRIRA] 
thus reflect a congressional determination that state cooperation 
with the INS is a permissible, indeed desirable, supplement to fed-
eral policy.260 
The state further argued that, even though the federal anti-sanctuary 
statutes permitted but did not require cooperation and reporting to the 
 
cooperation between state and local government entities and the INS. The Court 
agrees that some cooperation is permitted and even required by the [Act]. However, 
the cooperation and reporting detailed in . . . Proposition 187 are part of a regulatory 
scheme preempted by federal law, as explained in [LULAC I]. These sections of 
Proposition 187 require state officials, teachers, health care providers and other 
unknown individuals to report to the [INS] information about alien status that such 
individuals are not permitted to determine. Nothing in [LULAC I] should be 
interpreted to prohibit cooperation between state officials and the [INS] pursuant to 
the [Welfare Reform Act].” (citations omitted)). 
258 See Margaret Talev, Reaction Subdued on Prop. 187, L.A. Times (July 30, 1999), 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/jul/30/local/me-60918. 
259 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 256, at 45–47 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 611a 
(2012)). Section 611a mandates that agencies that administer Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), housing-assistance programs, and Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families “furnish information about aliens they know to be unlawfully in the United 
States to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at least four times 
annually and upon INS request.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 382 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
260 Brief of Appellants, supra note 256, at 47. 
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extent that the state law did, there was no conflict since “compliance with 
both state and federal law [was] possible” and the state laws were not an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal laws.261 Essentially here, the 
state argued that because the state law provisions mirrored those in the 
federal law, and even in some ways were more comprehensive than fed-
eral law, they survived conflict preemption.262 
The plaintiffs rejected the assertion that §§ 1644 and 1373 impacted 
the court’s preemption analysis, arguing instead that they confirmed the 
federal government’s determination to occupy the area of immigration 
regulation.263 Had Congress intended to open up the area of immigration 
law-making to states, they argued that Congress could have expressly 
done so, and pointed to a provision of the Welfare Reform Act where 
Congress had permitted states to enact such legislation in limited circum-
stances.264 Instead, plaintiffs argued that the immigration-related provi-
sions of the Welfare Act and IIRIRA mandated immigration-status report-
ing in certain limited circumstances and “otherwise expressly permit[ed] 
and explicitly protect[ed] the continued ability of local entities to choose 
whether or not to report or cooperate.”265 Presaging arguments that 
would be made by the United States more than a decade later in United 
States v. Arizona, the plaintiffs also argued that the mandatory coopera-
tion and reporting provisions of Proposition 187 were in conflict with the 
voluntary reporting provided for in §§ 1644 and 1373: 
There is, of course an important distinction—and conflict—
between a mandate and an authority or permission. Moreover, the 
distinction would create havoc with the federal scheme and objec-
tives . . . . [Proposition 187] would undermine enforcement of fed-
eral immigration laws by interposing a separate state program that 
overwhelms the efforts of the federal agency.266 
 
261 Id. at 53. 
262 The argument that state immigration laws that “mirror” federal law are not 
preempted has been widely used by proponents of state involvement in immigration 
enforcement. For a comprehensive critique of the mirror-image theory, particularly 
in the context of state criminal immigration law-making, see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc 
L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 
61 Duke L.J. 251, 278–79 (2011). 
263 Opening Brief of Gregorio T. Plaintiffs–Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 67–68, 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. 98-55671 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999) 
[hereinafter Brief of Appellee], 1999 WL 33729894. 
264 Id. at 67 (citing Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 411(d), 110 Stat. 2105, 2269 (requiring states that 
intend to reject the federal restriction on access by unauthorized immigrants to state-
funded public benefits to pass legislation specifically permitting such benefits)). 
265 Id. at 67. 
266 Id. at 84. 
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While the anti-sanctuary provision in Proposition 187 did not survive, 
it did not die in vain. In fact, it might properly be considered the mother 
of all anti-sanctuary provisions. Indeed, it is likely that political pressure 
brought to bear by the proponents of Proposition 187 ultimately led to 
the passage of §§ 1644 and 1373.267 However, the apparent ineffectiveness 
of §§ 1644 and 1373 at eliminating sanctuary laws and practices in the 
years following their enactment led not only to efforts by Congress to 
“put some teeth” in the federal anti-sanctuary statutes,268 but also to the 
steady proliferation of state anti-sanctuary provisions, many of which, like 
the proposals in Congress, included penalties for non-compliance.269 
Among the states that had enacted anti-sanctuary provisions by 2010 
when Arizona’s S.B. 1070 became law were Colorado,270 Georgia,271 Mis-
 
267 Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1339, 1371 (2013) 
(“It is easy to think of Proposition 187 as a quirk of California politics. Yet this 
overlooks the extent to which Proposition 187 was entangled with the national 
political conversation and national political actors. The chief architects and financial 
supporters of Proposition 187 were the Federation for American Immigration Reform 
(FAIR) and the Pioneer Fund—both major political organizations interested 
foremost in national policy reform rather than immigration policies tailored to 
specific states. The authors of Proposition 187 were prominent figures in federal 
politics: Alan Nelson, who served as the Commissioner of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) under President Reagan; and Harold Ezell, who was the 
western regional commissioner for INS at the same time. It was also clear that the 
authors of Proposition 187 were primarily interested in federal policies. Ezell argued 
that ‘[t]here’s no need for another Proposition 187 in any other state if Congress 
does its job.’” (footnotes omitted)); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in 
an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. J. Int’l. L. 121, 125–26 (1994). 
268 Tom Tancredo, Editorial, Should Congress Cut Money to States and Cities that Use 
Tax Dollars to Aid Illegal Immigrants?, Duluth News-Trib. (May 6, 2006), 2006 WLNR 
7763717 (discussing repeated efforts by the author, Colorado Representative Tom 
Tancredo, to cut off all federal funding to localities with sanctuary laws in order to 
“put some teeth into our anti-sanctuary laws”). 
269 Of course, the subsequent proliferation of state anti-sanctuary and other pro-
enforcement measures is indicative of the failure of the federal anti-sanctuary 
provisions and IIRIRA in general as effective responses to unauthorized immigration. 
Rather than driving the unauthorized immigrant population out of the United States, 
IIRIRA provisions that made it more difficult for immigrants to move back and forth 
between jobs in the United States and family south of the border had the opposite 
effect. “Enhanced border controls and harsh penalties for unlawful entry to or 
presence in the United States created a disincentive for unauthorized immigrants to 
return home either because they wanted to avoid the perils and expense of another 
unauthorized entry or because leaving could mean a lengthy separation from [U.S. 
citizen] or permanent resident family members in the United States.” Elizabeth 
McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing Off Steam or 
Setting Wildfires?, 23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 293, 319 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
270 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-29-103 (2012) (repealed 2013). Colorado’s law, enacted 
while sanctuary provisions were in place in Denver, Boulder, and Durango, required 
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souri,272 Oklahoma,273 Tennessee,274 and Utah.275 In Oklahoma, the anti-
sanctuary provision prohibited any restrictions on cooperation as well as 
communication with federal immigration authorities, and provided for a 
right of action by any state resident to force compliance with the stat-
ute.276 In Missouri and Ohio, non-compliant government entities would 
be denied state funding.277 A number of other states tried unsuccessfully 
to pass anti-sanctuary laws in the years leading up to Arizona’s adoption 
of S.B.1070.278 The outcome of United States v. Arizona279 would clarify the 
limits of state and local authority to cooperate and assist with federal im-
migration law enforcement. 
B. United States v. Arizona: The Evolving Meaning of §§ 1644 and 1373 
The competing characterizations of §§ 1644 and 1373—on the one 
hand, as expressions of Congress’s clear intent to maximize cooperation 
between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in enforcing 
federal immigration laws and, on the other hand, as explicit limits on the 
nature of non-federal engagement in immigration enforcement—came 
head to head in United States v. Arizona.280 In this challenge to the Arizona 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070), 
the United States sought to enjoin a number of provisions of a now-
infamous state law that was widely regarded as a model for states seeking 
to maximize their engagement in immigration enforcement.281 Two of 
the challenged provisions, §§ 3 and 5(c), created new state crimes and 
 
police to contact ICE whenever a person suspected of being an unauthorized 
immigrant was arrested on a misdemeanor or felony charge. See Anti-Sanctuary Law 
Sets Off Consular Tiff, Wash. Times (May 7, 2006), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2006/may/7/20060507-121634-7756r/print/. 
271 Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-23 (2012). 
272 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 650.475 (West 2014). 
273 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j (West 2015). 
274 Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-68-103 (2011). 
275 Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1006 (LexisNexis 2012)(declared preempted in part 
by Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1143 (D. Utah 2014)). 
276 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j(F) (West 2015). 
277 See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 650.475(5) (West 2014); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.63(C) 
(West Supp. 2014). 
278 See Anna Gorman, Arizona’s Immigration Law Isn’t the Only One, L.A. Times (July 
16, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/16/nation/la-na-immigration-states-
20100717. 
279 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012). 
280 See id. at 350–51. 
281 See id. at 343–44; Seth Freed Wessler, Bills Modeled After Arizona’s SB 1070 
Spread Through States, Race Forward: Colorlines, (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www. 
colorlines.com/content/bills-modeled-after-arizonas-sb-1070-spread-through-states 
(listing 16 states considering bills modeled after S.B. 1070). 
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criminal penalties for failing to comply with federal alien-registration re-
quirements and working without authorization.282 Section 2(E) author-
ized warrantless arrests by Arizona officers when there is probable cause 
to believe that a person has committed a “public offense that makes the 
person removable from the United States.”283 Section 2(B), the so-called 
“show me your papers” provision, required police officers to verify the 
immigration status of anyone stopped or detained for any reason where 
the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the person is unlawfully 
present in the United States.284 The Supreme Court found that three out 
of four provisions challenged by the United States and previously en-
joined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, were preempted by federal 
law.285 Section 2(B) survived a facial challenge.286 The federal anti-
sanctuary provisions played a significant role in the arguments on both 
sides of the case, and in particular with respect to the challenge to 
§ 2(B). 
As a starting point, it is worth noting that, in addition to § 2(B)’s 
mandatory immigration status checks, § 2 of S.B. 1070 also contained its 
own anti-sanctuary provisions, that read, in part: 
A. No official or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other 
political subdivision of this state may limit or restrict the enforce-
ment of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permit-
ted by federal law. 
. . . . 
F. Except as provided in federal law, officials or agencies of this 
state and counties, cities, towns and other political subdivisions of 
this state may not be prohibited or in any way be restricted from 
sending, receiving or maintaining information relating to the im-
migration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual or exchang-
ing that information with any other federal, state or local govern-
mental entity for the following official purposes: 
1. Determining eligibility for any public benefit, service or license 
provided by any federal, state, local or other political subdivision of 
this state. 
2. Verifying any claim of residence or domicile if determination of 
residence or domicile is required under the laws of this state or a 
judicial order issued pursuant to a civil or criminal proceeding in 
this state. 
 
282 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 3, 5(c) (Ariz. 2010). 
283 Id. § 2(E). 
284 Id. § 2(B). 
285 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–07 (2012). 
286 Id. at 2510. 
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3. If the person is an alien, determining whether the person is in 
compliance with the federal registration laws prescribed by title II, 
chapter 7 of the federal immigration and nationality act. 
4. Pursuant to 8 United States Code § 1373 and 8 United States 
Code § 1644. 
. . . . 
H. A person who is a legal resident of this state may bring an action 
in superior court to challenge any official or agency of this state or 
a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state that 
adopts or implements a policy that limits or restricts the enforce-
ment of federal immigration laws, including 8 United States Code 
§§ 1373 and 1644, to less than the full extent permitted by federal 
law. If there is a judicial finding that an entity has violated this sec-
tion, the court shall order that the entity pay a civil penalty of not 
less than five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dol-
lars for each day that the policy has remained in effect after the fil-
ing of an action pursuant to this subsection. 
. . . . 
K. Except in relation to matters in which the officer is adjudged to 
have acted in bad faith, a law enforcement officer is indemnified by 
the law enforcement officer’s agency against reasonable costs and 
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by the officer in con-
nection with any action, suit or proceeding brought pursuant to this 
section in which the officer may be a defendant by reason of the of-
ficer being or having been a member of the law enforcement agen-
cy.287 
Like many other jurisdictions, Arizona had adopted its anti-sanctuary 
provision as part of a more comprehensive effort to engage state agencies 
and officers in immigration enforcement at a time of growing frustration 
with federal immigration-enforcement efforts, including frustration with 
the administration’s failure to stop the proliferation of sanctuary cities in 
violation of §§ 1644 and 1373.288 Arizona’s anti-sanctuary provision went 
further than §§ 1644 and 1373 by providing an enforcement mechanism 
that allowed residents of the state to bring a civil action against any non-
 
287 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 (2012)  
288 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Landmark Legal Foundation in Support of 
Petitioners at 18, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (“[The United 
States’s] decision to prevent Arizona from protecting its citizens is even more galling 
in light of its willful failure to stop more egregious actions by state and local 
governments around the country that are in violation of and contrary to federal law. 
Certain states and local governments have decided to flout federal law and declare 
themselves ‘sanctuary cities’ where immigration status is concealed from federal 
authorities. Many have also decided to provide in-state tuition benefits to illegal 
aliens, in direct contravention of federal law.”). 
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complying jurisdiction. It also provided that government entities found 
to have enacted or implemented a policy or practice restricting the en-
forcement of federal immigration laws, including §§ 1644 and 1377, are 
subject to hefty financial penalties.289 Additionally, the anti-sanctuary pro-
vision leaves open the possibility that individual police officers could be 
made to bear the costs of a legal challenge if they are found to have acted 
in bad faith, arguably incentivizing officers to over-comply with the man-
dated immigration cooperation and reporting in order to avoid being 
found in violation.290 Arizona’s anti-sanctuary provision was not among 
the four challenged provisions of S.B. 1070 considered by the Supreme 
Court.291 However, like the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, they were inte-
gral to the arguments in United States v. Arizona for and against S.B. 1070. 
The United States argued that § 2(B) of S.B. 1070 was preempted by 
8 U.S.C. § 1373.292 Section 2(B)’s mandatory status-check, according to 
the United States, was preempted because it stood as an obstacle to the 
federal–state cooperation § 1373 envisioned by forcing officers to make 
status inquiries irrespective of whether such inquiries were in line with 
the government’s immigration-enforcement priorities.293 The United 
States contended that § 2(B)’s mandatory status checks, together with the 
civil penalties imposed in § 2(H) for failing to comply with this mandate, 
stood in conflict with federal law and threatened to divert federal re-
sources from the federal government’s immigration enforcement priori-
ties.294 Rather than facilitating cooperation and information sharing, as 
§ 1373 envisioned, S.B. 1070 “harnesses the federal apparatus in pursuit 
 
289 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(H). 
290 See Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policy Making, 79 UMKC L. 
Rev. 901, 914 (2011). 
291 Potential challenges to subsections 2(A), (C)–(G), and (I)–(L) were dismissed 
by the district court. See Order at 12–13, United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-
PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. Dec. 10, 2010). 
292 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2508; Brief for the United States, supra 
note 17, at 50–52. 
293 Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 48 (“DHS’s highest enforcement 
priorities are aliens who threaten public safety or national security and members of 
criminal gangs that smuggle aliens and contraband. DHS also gives priority to 
removing repeat border crossers, recent entrants, aliens who have previously been 
removed, and aliens who have disregarded a final order of removal.”); see also 
Complaint at 17, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 
2:10-cv-01413-NVW) (“The mandatory nature of Section 2, in tandem with S.B. 1070’s 
new or amended state immigration crimes, directs officers to seek maximum scrutiny 
of a person’s immigration status, and mandates the imposition of state criminal 
penalties for what is effectively unlawful presence, even in circumstances where the 
federal government has decided not to impose such penalties because of federal 
enforcement priorities or humanitarian, foreign policy, or other federal interests.”).  
294 Complaint, supra note 293, at 16–18. 
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of a scheme over which the federal government would have no control, 
and would proceed without regard to federal practice and policy and the 
essential nature of the cooperative relationship.”295 According to the 
United States, §§ 1644 and 1373 were intended to facilitate mutual in-
formation sharing, including by preempting state and local sanctuary 
measures, such as the one at issue in City of New York v. United States,296 
which restricted immigration-related information sharing.297 The federal 
anti-sanctuary provisions did this by ensuring that there would be no re-
strictions on information sharing by state and local governments and, in 
§ 1373(c), mandating that ICE reply to those requests for information. 
But, the United States argued that § 1373 “does not sanction efforts to 
use DHS resources to enforce the federal immigration laws without re-
gard to federal priorities and discretion.”298 The conflict between § 2(B) 
and the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, the United States argued, 
stemmed essentially from the mandatory nature of the reporting re-
quired by § 2(B), a mandate not present in §§ 1373 and 1644, which re-
quire nothing on the part of state and local governments but merely en-
sure that they not be restricted in their ability to communicate with 
federal immigration authorities.299 That mandate in § 2(B) eliminates the 
discretion necessary for state and local actors to cooperate with and oth-
erwise act in conformity with federal immigration priorities. 
Arizona’s arguments in support of S.B. 1070, and § 2(B) in particu-
lar, centered largely on an assertion that Congress had enacted numer-
ous laws and policies, including §§ 1644 and 1373, that reflected a broad 
intent to encourage state and local cooperation in immigration enforce-
ment, and that S.B. 1070 was completely consistent with those policies.300 
Arizona identified sanctuary laws and policies enacted by state and local 
governments as one of two primary sets of obstacles to the enforcement 
of federal immigration laws, to which the Federal Government had re-
sponded in 1996 by “establish[ing] a federal policy of encouraging coop-
eration among federal, state, and local authorities in enforcing the fed-
eral immigration laws,” and implementing that policy through §§ 1644 
and 1373.301 Thus, according to Arizona, §§ 1644 and 1373 were more 
than anti-sanctuary provisions. They were pro-enforcement provisions.302 
 
295 Brief for Appellee at 50, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162512. 
296 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
297 Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 51–52. 
298 Id. at 52. 
299 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
300 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 16, at 12–13. 
301 Id. at 7–9. 
302 Id. at 27 (“Congress has expressed a clear intent to encourage the assistance 
from state and local law enforcement officers in the enforcement of federal 
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Pointing to §§ 1644 and 1373, Arizona asserted that “Congress ex-
pressly contemplated that state and local law enforcement officers and 
agencies would inquire into the immigration status of lawfully-present al-
iens, and Congress determined—mandated—that ICE respond because 
Congress concluded that this sharing of information was of critical im-
portance in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.”303 Indeed, ac-
cording to Arizona, §§ 1644 and 1373 not only mandate that ICE respond 
to inquiries from state and local law enforcement, they also mandate that 
state and local officers make such inquiries.304 In this respect, Arizona 
contended that § 2(B) of S.B. 1070, by mandating immigration-status in-
quiries, simply mirrored the federal anti-sanctuary provisions, and so 
questioned the viability of the United States’s conflict preemption argu-
ment.305 And in response to the Ninth Circuit’s more limited characteri-
zation of §§ 1373 and 1644 as “anti-sanctuary provisions” that prohibit 
states from impeding immigration enforcement but are not an “invita-
tion” to states to enact immigration legislation,306 Arizona argued instead 
that “these provisions expressly confirm that nothing in federal law stands 
in the way of state statutes such as § 2(B).”307 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding 
that § 2(B) was preempted.308 The Court found that the mandatory na-
ture of § 2(B)’s immigration status checks did not interfere or conflict 
with federal law, even if those status checks took place under circum-
stances that would fall outside the federal government’s immigration en-
forcement priorities.309 While the Court expressed support for the federal 
government’s discretionary authority in implementing federal immigra-
 
immigration laws that section 2(B) would provide.”). 
303 Id. 
304 See Brief for Petitioners at 24–25, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 
11-182), 2012 WL 416748, at *8 (“The federal immigration laws not only decline to 
preempt state law enforcement efforts, they affirmatively require federal 
cooperation.”). 
305 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 299, at 21–22 (“It does do one thing 
that’s very important, though, which it does have the effect of overriding local 
policies that actually forbad some officers from making those communications . . . 
because that’s one of the primary effects of 2(B). It just shows how difficult the 
government’s preemption argument is here because those kind of local policies are 
expressly forbidden by Federal statute. [Sections 1373(a) and 1644] basically say that 
localities can’t have those kind of sanctuary laws. And so one effect that 2(B) has is, 
on a state level, it basically says, look, you can’t have local officers telling you not to 
make those inquiries. You must have those inquiries.”). 
306 See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 351 n.11 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d in 
part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
307 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 304, at 37. 
308 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. 
309 Id. at 2508. 
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tion law,310 the Court found nothing in federal law which required state 
or local law enforcement officers to consider federal enforcement priori-
ties in deciding whether to contact ICE to obtain status information 
about a person who has been lawfully detained.311 Additionally, the Court 
seemed unpersuaded that § 2(B) would inevitably lead to a conflict with 
federal enforcement priorities since, even if Arizona law enforcement 
contacted ICE about a detained person, ICE ultimately retained the au-
thority to decide how and whether to enforce federal immigration laws in 
each case.312 Concluding that the federal statutory scheme, including 
§§ 1644 and 1373, encouraged the sharing of information about possible 
immigration violations, the Court determined that it “leaves room for a 
policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.”313 No-
tably, the Court interpreted § 2(B) to permit status inquiries and infor-
mation sharing with ICE only in the context of an otherwise constitution-
al stop or arrest. While acknowledging that § 2(B) might be applied in a 
way that would raise constitutional concerns, the Court concluded that 
§ 2(B) survived a facial challenge absent “some showing that enforce-
ment of the provision in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and 
its objectives.”314 
In the end, neither side succeeded in getting the Court to adopt its 
interpretation of the federal anti-sanctuary statutes. The Court rejected 
the United States’s narrow interpretation of permissible state–federal 
immigration cooperation and its argument that “by refusing to respect 
Congress’s designation of the Executive Branch to take the lead in the 
 
310 See id. at 2499 (“A principal feature of the removal system is the broad 
discretion exercised by immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial matter, 
must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings 
commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to 
remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal.” (citation 
omitted)). 
311 Id. at 2508. 
312 During oral argument, several Justices questioned the Solicitor General about 
the actual impact of calls to ICE in circumstances where the detained individual 
might not be an enforcement priority, and suggested that ICE still maintained 
authority over the ultimate decision regarding enforcement. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 299, at 71 (“All it does is lets you know . . . that an illegal alien 
has been arrested, and you can decide, we are not going to initiate removal 
proceedings against that individual. It doesn’t require you to remove one more 
person than you would like to remove under your priorities.”); id. at 56 (“[I]t’s not 
that it’s forcing you to change your enforcement priorities. You don’t have to take the 
person into custody.”). 
313 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (citing Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985–86 (2011) (finding no preemption of Arizona law 
requiring that employers verify the immigration status of employees using a federal 
system that had been promoted by the United States)). 
314 Id. at 2510. 
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enforcement of the federal immigration laws, and by requiring all Arizo-
na officers to adhere instead to the State’s own policy of ‘attrition 
through enforcement,’ Arizona exceeded the permissible bounds of co-
operation” between states and the federal government provided for in 
federal immigration law.315 
On the other hand, the Court also rejected the expanded interpreta-
tion of permissible state–federal cooperation proffered by Arizona in its 
defense of S.B. 1070 § 6, which authorized warrantless arrests for immi-
gration violations: “There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes 
cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the 
term would incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest 
an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or other in-
struction from the Federal Government.”316 
VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AN ANTI-SANCTUARY 
APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
In the almost 20 years since the adoption of the federal anti-
sanctuary provisions, some clarity about the meaning and the purpose of 
the statutes has emerged. First, despite all arguments to the contrary, the 
federal anti-sanctuary statutes do not mandate that states and localities 
do anything.317 The argument that the statutes mandate state action, 
whether that is in the form of information sharing, information gather-
ing, or general cooperation around immigration enforcement, has been 
repeatedly rejected, whether argued by those wanting to invalidate anti-
sanctuary laws318 or by those seeking to invalidate sanctuary provisions.319 
Indeed, Congress expressed its intent not to mandate but simply to au-
thorize communication with federal immigration authorities from the 
very beginning.320 
A second point of clarity, related to the first, is that the anti-sanctuary 
statutes prohibit restrictions on communication; they do not prohibit re-
strictions on other activities by state and local agencies and officers.321 
Therefore, a state or municipal government can prohibit its employees or 
officers from inquiring about immigration status where it is not otherwise 
required by law or from initiating contact with individuals for the pur-
 
315 Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 43. 
316 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. 
317 See, e.g., City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999). 
318 See id. 
319 See Doe v. City of New York, 860 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
320 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
321 Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 731 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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pose of discovering their immigration statuses.322 On the other hand, 
states and municipalities may not, consistent with §§ 1644 and 1373, 
place restrictions on immigration-related information sharing with the 
federal immigration authorities, unless that restriction is part of a broad-
er policy to protect confidential information from disclosure.323 
Third, the anti-sanctuary statutes do not provide for a private right of 
action for individuals claiming harm in connection with them, whether 
that claim is for damages or to compel compliance with the statutes.324 
Indeed, allegations that the anti-sanctuary statutes have been both unen-
forceable and unenforced have led members of Congress to attempt to 
amend the statutes numerous times in recent years to include enforce-
ment provisions and penalties.325 These efforts have so far all failed but 
have included proposals to deny funding to jurisdictions that fail to com-
ply with §§ 1373 and 1644, and creating civil or criminal liability for fail-
ures to comply.326 
Fourth, the federal anti-sanctuary measures do not repeal or other-
wise override the privacy protections in other federal statutes, including 
FERPA and HIPAA. Most importantly, they do not provide a blank check 
for the voluntary sharing of information that is otherwise protected from 
disclosure under federal law. Moreover, the unauthorized release of oth-
erwise protected records to federal immigration officers pursuant to the 
permission granted under §§ 1644 and 1373 may be punishable with civil 
and criminal penalties.327 
Finally, states and municipalities may mandate certain types of coop-
eration with federal immigration enforcement without conflict with the 
anti-sanctuary statutes.328 In particular, state statutes that mandate immi-
gration status checks and reporting are not preempted per se by the fed-
eral anti-sanctuary statutes or the federal government’s exclusive power 
over immigration.329 However, mandatory status checks, reporting or oth-
 
322 Id. 
323 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999). 
324 See Lewis v. City of Kimball, No. 4:06CV3084, 2006 WL 2375479, at *6 (D. Neb. 
Aug. 14, 2006); Bologna v. City and County of San Francisco, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 
414–15 (Ct. App. 2011); Doe, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 844–45. 
325 See, e.g., Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. 
(2015); Subcomm. on Investig. of the Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 
Criminal Aliens in the United States, S. Rep. No. 104-48, 30 (1995). 
326 Id. n.75. 
327 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2012) (HIPAA penalties); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723–
2724 (2012) (Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 penalties). 
328 Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 581–82 (Ct. App. 2008). 
329 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508–10 (2012); Sturgeon v. Bratton, 
95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 731–33 (Ct. App. 2009). 
LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete) 5/24/2016  4:23 PM 
2016] FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW 231 
 
er cooperation that in practice conflicts or interferes with the federal 
government’s immigration enforcement authority are preempted.330 
In the wake of the tragic killing of Kate Steinle, with overwhelming 
attention and criticism focused on San Francisco’s sanctuary law, the les-
sons learned about the anti-sanctuary provisions over two decades may 
help guide the conversation going forward. A torrent of blame for Kate 
Steinle’s death has been unleashed against various city officials and agen-
cies for implementing San Francisco’s sanctuary ordinances, allegedly in 
violation of the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, and against the Obama 
administration for a failure to enforce the anti-sanctuary provisions 
against San Francisco and against sanctuary cities in general.331 The famil-
iar complaint of supporters of tougher immigration enforcement—that if 
the laws on the books were just enforced, the problem of unauthorized 
immigration would be solved—runs through these arguments.332 In other 
words, if the federal anti-sanctuary provisions had been enforced, Lopez-
Sanchez would not have been released and Kate Steinle would not be 
dead. Unfortunately, these criticisms fail to acknowledge at least two crit-
ical points. First, by all accounts, the decision to release Lopez-Sanchez 
was not premised on San Francisco’s City of Refuge ordinance, but in-
stead was based on the 2013 city ordinance prescribing the circumstances 
in which a federal immigration detainer could be honored.333 While there 
is disagreement about whether the sheriff’s office misinterpreted the de-
 
330 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 351–52 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part, 
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
331 Valerie Richardson, Kathryn Steinle Killing Fuels Outrage over Democrats’ 
Deportation Opposition, Wash. Times (July 6, 2015) http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2015/jul/6/kathryn-steinle-killing-fuels-outrage-over-democra/?page=all 
(reporting statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte that the administration was “releasing 
criminals back onto the streets” and was “not enforcing our immigration laws . . . 
[a]nd, quite frankly, I don’t think they care”). 
332 See, e.g., Jessica M. Vaughan, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective 
Strategy to Shrink the Illegal Population, Ctr. for Immigr. Stud.: Backgrounder (Apr. 
2006), http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2006/back406.pdf; Attrition Through 
Enforcement Is the True Middle-Ground Solution, NumbersUSA (Feb. 17, 2015), 
https://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/american-workers/attrition-
through-enforcement-true-middl.html (“[L]iving illegally in the United States will 
become more difficult and less satisfying over time when the government—at ALL 
LEVELS—enforces all of the laws already on the books.”). But see The Fallacy of 
“Enforcement First,” Am. Immigr. Council (May 9, 2013), http://www. 
immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/fallacy-enforcement-first (describing the futility of 
enforcing unworkable laws that themselves promote unauthorized immigration). 
333 See Press Release, Office of the Sheriff, City & Cty. of S.F., Sheriff Ross 
Mirkarimi Sets the Record Straight on the April 2015 Release of Juan Francisco 
Lopez-Sanchez and Offers Recommendations for the Future (July 10, 2015), http:// 
www.sfsheriff.com/files/SFSD_PR_RM_07_10_15.pdf. 
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tainer ordinance in deciding to release Lopez-Sanchez,334 the detainer 
ordinance itself does not conflict with federal law. The 1996 anti-
sanctuary statutes do not mandate in any way that any jurisdiction honor 
a detainer request from ICE, such as the one provided to San Francisco 
before the release of Francisco Lopez-Sanchez. Indeed, not only is com-
pliance with such requests not mandated by the federal anti-sanctuary 
provisions, it is also not mandated by the federal regulations authorizing 
ICE to issue detainers.335 Secondly, San Francisco’s City of Refuge Ordi-
nance would not have prohibited the Sheriff from contacting ICE about 
Lopez-Sanchez, because it permits cooperation and communication with 
ICE in cases involving individuals with prior felony convictions.336 Even 
without holding Lopez-Sanchez on the ICE detainer, the Sheriff would 
have been free to notify ICE that his San Francisco criminal matter was 
dismissed and that he would soon be released so that ICE could make ar-
rangements to take him into custody.337 Thus, even had the Obama ad-
ministration enforced the anti-sanctuary provisions against San Francisco, 
it is far from clear that this would have prevented the release of Lopez-
Sanchez or the killing of Kate Steinle. 
Nevertheless, the political reaction to the killing has been swift. 
Within weeks of Steinle’s death, several proposals were introduced in 
Congress that would prohibit federal funding to states and cities that 
have sanctuary policies in place.338 There were also proposals to mandate 
 
334 See Vivian Ho, S.F. Deputies Union Ties Pier Killing to Sheriff’s Order, S.F. Chron. 
(July 17, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/S-F-deputies-union-ties-
pier-killing-to-6389935.php (discussing complaint against sheriff by deputy-sheriffs’ 
union alleging that a memo issued by the Sheriff in connection with the detainer 
ordinance improperly prohibited staff from giving information about detainees to 
immigration agents). 
335 See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 2015) (requiring 
probable cause for an ICE agent to issue an immigration detainer); Galarza v. 
Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that immigration detainers under 
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 are voluntary requests to state and local law enforcement to detain a 
person for no more than an additional 48 hours). The Third Circuit cited various 
local laws limiting cooperation on immigration detainers, including in Santa Clara 
County, California, New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco, as evidence that 
immigration detainers cannot be mandatory. Id. at 645 & n.10. 
336 See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12H.2-1 (2015); Ho, supra note 334 (reporting 
statement of Mayor Ed Lee that “nothing in this sanctuary-city law prohibits the 
officials of the city and county of San Francisco to communicate, to engage in 
discussion”). 
337 ICE officials contend that they could have easily made arrangements to take 
Lopez-Sanchez into custody immediately upon his arrest if they had notified, though 
ICE’s reliability in that regard is disputed. See Eric Kurhi & Matthew Artz, As S.F. 
Shooting Suspect Apologizes, Factions Square Off over Noncompliance Policy, San Jose 
Mercury News (July 7, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_ 
28442952/s-f-shooting-suspect-apologizes-actions-square-off. 
338 S. 1640, 114th Cong. § 114 (2015); H.R. 1148, 114th Cong. § 114 (2015); see 
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reporting of immigration-status related information every time anyone 
suspected of being an unauthorized immigrant is taken into custody.339 
Another bill, Kate’s Law, championed by Fox News commentator Bill 
O’Reilly, imposes a mandatory five-year prison term following a convic-
tion for illegal reentry after a deportation.340 Similar measures have been 
introduced before and failed,341 and though there is momentum to take 
action in response to Kate Steinle’s death, there are reasons to proceed 
with caution. First, an unfunded mandate to states and cities to report in-
formation about suspected unauthorized immigrants to ICE, as at least 
one of the current proposals includes, would not survive a Tenth 
Amendment challenge.342 Alternatively, cutting off federal funding to 
states and cities that are resistant to engaging in immigration enforce-
ment, while it may survive a constitutional challenge, is likely to test al-
ready strained relationships between ICE and state and local govern-
ments and law enforcement agencies.343 Forcing states and cities to 
engage under threat of critical funding loss may result in more participa-
tion by states and cities but it ignores their legitimate concerns about the 
detrimental impact on community policing and public health and safety. 
Similarly, imposing mandatory sentences for unlawful reentry seems also 
to miss the mark since this would likely divert already scarce resources to 
the prosecution and incarceration of individuals, most of whom are not 
likely to be serious criminals or otherwise pose a danger to the communi-
 
also San Francisco Shooting Prompts Debate Over ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ CQ News (July 13, 
2015), 2015 WLNR 21363609 (discussing introduction of several bills targeting 
sanctuary cities). 
339 S. 1640 § 111(2); H.R. 1148 § 111(2). 
340 See Erik Wemple, Fox News’s Bill O’Reilly Embraces Activism with ‘Kate’s Law,’ 
Wash. Post (July 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/ 
wp/2015/07/14/c/. 
341 S. 169, 112th Cong. (2011) (restricting funding to sanctuary cities); see also 
H.R. 2217, 113th Cong. § 577 (as reported by S. Comm. on Appropriations, July 18, 
2013) (removing a provision that would have denied funds for use in contravention 
of §§ 1644 and 1373); Andrew Adams, Congressman Wants to Penalize Salt Lake City over 
Immigration Enforcement, Deseret News (May 11, 2011), http://www.deseretnews. 
com/article/705372473/Congressman-wants-to-penalize-Salt-Lake-City-over-immigration- 
enforcement.html (discussing bill introduced by representative Lou Barletta to 
withhold federal funding to sanctuary cities). 
342 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular 
problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program.”) 
343 See Homeland Security Hearing, supra note 9, at 9 (statement of Jeh Johnson, 
U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Security) (stating that one challenge to immigration 
enforcement is “fixing our relationship with State and local law enforcement”). 
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ty.344 Federal law already provides for criminal fines and imprisonment up 
to 20 years for unlawful reentry after removal.345 Given the fact that 
Lopez-Sanchez had been prosecuted and imprisoned three times for un-
lawful reentry after a removal, in one case serving more than four years in 
prison, he was apparently not deterred from returning to the United 
States by the threat of incarceration.346 
Perhaps the biggest lesson learned 20 years after the passage of 
§§ 1644 and 1373 is that an anti-sanctuary approach to unauthorized 
immigration does not lead to real solutions. The anti-sanctuary statutes, if 
they have been effective at all, have been effective as weapons of political 
rhetoric, designed to send a message that unauthorized immigrants have 
no place to hide and to, as much as constitutionally permissible, enlist 
states and municipalities in joining in delivering that message. Sanctuary, 
like amnesty, has become a term so wrought with controversy and deri-
sion, that public officials, lawmakers, and especially political candidates, 
deny any association with it. This is no wonder since, in the context of the 
national debate on immigration, sanctuary has become synonymous with 
“pro illegal immigration.” Jurisdictions that have adopted laws or policies 
that restrict involvement in immigration enforcement or otherwise allow 
law-abiding unauthorized immigrants to live in a community without fear 
are accused of protecting lawbreakers and even being lawbreakers them-
selves. From the perspective of critics of sanctuary policies, anything short 
of full enforcement of the immigration laws is properly labeled as sanctu-
ary, including most recently the Obama administration’s efforts to priori-
tize enforcement resources through the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion.347 
The federal anti-sanctuary laws, by encouraging state and local gov-
ernments to assist with immigration enforcement by enlisting personnel 
from local law enforcement, schools, hospitals, and other public agen-
cies, have become an integral piece of immigration restrictionists’ attri-
tion-through-enforcement strategy.348 This is a strategy designed to drive 
 
344 See Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, 
Records Show, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/ 
more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html. 
345 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012). 
346 See Romney et al., supra note 1. 
347 See Homeland Security Hearing, supra note 9, at 2–3 (statement of Bob 
Goodlatte, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary); Foley, supra note 22. 
348 A key component of this strategy is enlisting cooperation and assistance from 
states and localities in immigration enforcement in order to “discourage the 
settlement of illegal aliens and to make it more difficult for illegal aliens to conceal 
their status.” See Michele Waslin, Immigration Policy Ctr., Discrediting “Self 
Deportation” as Immigration Policy 4 (Feb. 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy. 
org/sites/default/files/docs/Waslin_-_Attrition_Through_Enforcement_020612.pdf 
(quoting Vaughan, supra note 332, at 3). 
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unauthorized immigrants out of the United States through a combina-
tion of increased local enforcement efforts and laws that make it difficult 
to find work or a place to live or to access public services. But as states 
and cities have grown more concerned about the loss of trust between 
law enforcement agencies and immigrant residents and the harm to pub-
lic health and safety, they have also become more resistant to efforts to 
engage them in increasingly more aggressive federal enforcement pro-
grams.349 Recently, federal immigration authorities have begun to re-
spond to this resistance, recognizing that a stronger and stronger push 
for state and local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement ef-
forts, without regard for the legitimate concerns of states and cities to 
protect public health and safety and promote the general welfare of their 
communities, has been a failure as an enforcement strategy.350 
The rush to take action following the death of Kate Steinle is under-
standable, but targeting sanctuary laws and policies will not solve the 
problem of unauthorized immigration any more than it would have pre-
vented the release of Lopez-Sanchez. That problem will not be solved 
without thoughtful, meaningful reforms that focus limited enforcement 
resources on serious threats to public safety and national security, while 
providing some solution for the millions of unauthorized immigrants liv-
ing in our communities who pose no threat. Anti-sanctuary policies alone 
were not the answer in 1996 and they are not the answer now. 
 
 
349 See Lynn Tramonte, Immigration Policy Ctr., Debunking the Myth of 
“Sanctuary Cities” 8 (April 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/ 
default/files/docs/Community_Policing_Policies_Protect_American_042611_update.
pdf (“287(g) and Secure Communities are two federal programs that involve state 
and local police in the deportation of immigrants. Although described as targeting 
foreign-born criminals, these programs—as well as the erroneous belief that state and 
local police have the ‘inherent authority’ to enforce civil immigration laws—are also 
sweeping up immigrants who have not committed crimes, and harming the 
relationship between police and the immigrant community.” (footnotes omitted)). 
350 See Statement from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Director Sarah 
R. Saldaña, U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement (Mar. 20, 2015), https:// 
www.ice.gov/news/releases/statement-us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-ice-
director-saldana (“The reality is that Secure Communities had become legally and 
politically controversial, and led to the enactment by numerous jurisdictions of laws, 
ordinances, directives and policies that limit their cooperation with ICE in our efforts 
to promote public safety. . . . The overriding objective is public safety, while 
implementing this new approach in a way that upholds the trusted relationships local 
law enforcement need to build with and among their communities, and we believe 
these officials will recognize and concur with our goals. Any effort at federal 
legislation now to mandate state and local law enforcement’s compliance with ICE 
detainers will, in our view, be a highly counterproductive step and lead to more 
resistance and less cooperation in our overall efforts to promote public safety.”). 
